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INTRODUCTION

"Beaten," "bruised," "tortured," "molested," "sexually violated," "burned,"
"killed": all words ripped from horrific headlines when foster parents abuse the
children they were meant to protect.' The perils facing California's foster
children are particularly acute. 2 According to the State's own data, a foster-care
1 See, e.g., David Crary, Foster Parents Discouraged by Deluge of Bad Publicity, L.A.
TIMES, June 22, 2003, at A22, availableat 2003 WL 2414859 (discussing media coverage of
children abused in foster care); Jim Davis & Michael Baker, Lawsuit Alleges Abuse of
Children, FRESNO BEE, Mar. 11, 2003, at Al (describing horrific abuse allegations,
including: foster parents starved, beat, tortured, and emotionally abused a four-year-old boy;
foster parents bound a child with duct tape and burned and scarred him; and foster parents
choked a seven-year-old foster child, tied him up with rope, and hung him on a bathroom
hook, with duct tape covering his eyes and face); Matthew Franck, Deaths Are Driving
Lawmakers to Change Foster Care, ST. LOUIs POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 2, 2003, at B1,
available at 2003 WL 3553150 (describing three-year-old foster child found chained to a
bed); Timothy Roche, The Crisis of Foster Care, TIME, Nov. 13, 2000, at 74, available at
2000 WL 28889353 (discussing foster care abuse cases, including allegations that a foster
grandmother battered and tortured a six-year-old boy; the foster child was tied with panty
hose and belts to a banister); State Agency Cited Hospital Where Foster Child Died, ST.
LOUIS POST-DIsPATCH, Mar. 24, 2003, at B4, available at 2003 WL 3565392 (describing
death of two-year-old foster child from foster parents' violent shaking).
2 See, e.g., Troy Anderson, Child Advocates Blast Ruling: County Held Blameless in FosterCare Case, L.A. DAILY NEWS, Nov. 12, 2002, at N4 (reporting foster parent's sexual abuse
of a fourteen-year-old foster child); Troy Anderson, Voodoo Foster Care Suit May End in
Settlement, L.A. DAILY NEWS, July 22, 2003, at N3, available at 2003 WL 5681474
(describing six foster care children who were physically abused, sexually abused, severely
neglected, and exposed to voodoo rituals in an insect-infested foster home); Davis & Baker,
supra note 1, at Al (describing horrific abuse allegations); Richard Fausset, Charges Filed
in Deaths of Two Boys Left in Car, L.A. TIMES, July 29, 2003, at B4, available at 2003 WL
2423796 (describing foster mother who left two foster sons in a car for five hours, where the
sons died of heat exposure); Charlie Goodyear, Contra Costa to Pay $500,000 in Molest
Case, S.F. CHRON., July 29, 2003, at A13, availableat 2003 WL 3759249 (describing foster
son who was molested and forced to share his foster father's bed); Jennifer Sinco Kelleher,
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child is almost twice as likely to be maltreated in California than elsewhere. -5
"California's foster care system is rated among the most dangerous to children
in the nation.",4 These statistics are troubling because California has the largest
child welfare services system in the country: twenty percent
of all children
5
nationwide in foster care-almost 100,000-are in California.
Historically, the failings of the California foster care system were often
blamed on budget constraints, inadequate staffing, or poor legislation.' But
given that the California Legislature, in conjunction with child advocacy
groups, has passed numerous legislative reforms and has spent billions of
dollars yearly on foster care, 8 commentators increasingly attribute the
County Agrees to More Foster Care Visits, L.A. TIMES, May 27, 2002, at Bl, available at
2002 WL 2478728 (describing abusive foster mother who would "dunk" her child's head in
the toilet when he asked for a drink of water); Greg Krikorian, Lawyers for Children Say
County Fails to Cooperate, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2001, at B 1 (describing infant permanently
brain-damaged from injuries inflicted by foster parents); A Share of Pain and Tears, PRESSENTERPRISE (Riverside, Cal.), Jan. 2, 2001, at BO 1 (describing twenty-three-month-old foster
child who was beaten and starved to death).
3 U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH

& HUMAN SERVS., FINAL REPORT: CALIFORNIA CHILD AND FAMILY
SERVICES REVIEW 2 (2003) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT] (observing that the rate of incidence

of maltreatment of children in California foster care for fiscal year 2002, as reported in the
state data profile, was 1.06% and did not meet the national standard of 0.57% or less).
4 Letter from Amici Curiae National Association of Counsel for Children and the
Children's
Advocacy Institute in Support of Real Party in Interest's Petition for Review in County of
Los Angeles v. Superior Court to Chief Justice Ronald M. George and the Associate Justices
of the California Supreme Court 12 (Nov. 5, 2002) (on file with California Supreme Court

and author); see also U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., AUDIT OF PROTECTIONS
PROVIDED TO FOSTER CARE CHILDREN THROUGH THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM IN
CALIFORNIA (2000) [hereinafter 2000 AUDIT OF PROTECTIONS] (finding "significant

problems" in the California foster care system).
5 LISA K. FOSTER, FOSTER CARE FUNDAMENTALS: AN OVERVIEW OF CALIFORNIA'S FOSTER

CARE SYSTEM 10 (2001) ("California has the largest child welfare services system in the
country: one in five of all child welfare children nationwide are in the California system.");
DIANE F. REED & KATE KARPILOW, UNDERSTANDING THE CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM IN
CALIFORNIA: A PRIMER FOR SERVICE PROVIDERS AND POLICY MAKERS 17 (2002) (indicating

that as of April 2002, over 91,000 children were in the California foster care system).
6Douglas J. Besharov, Protecting Children from Abuse: Should It Be a Legal Duty?, 11 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 509, 510-11 (1986) (noting that "until recently, [stories of abuse] were seen
as evidence of inadequate staffing and poor administrative procedures"); see also REED &
KARPILOW, supra note 5, at 25 (describing a "severe shortage of social workers" and
caseloads at "twice the recommended levels"). But cf Troy Anderson, Foster Care in Crisis,
L.A. DAILY NEWS, Dec. 28, 2003, at N1 (quoting social worker who says that social workers
"used to have 80 to 100 cases" but now have approximately thirty).
7 LITTLE HOOVER COMM'N, STILL IN OUR
HANDS: A REVIEW OF EFFORTS TO REFORM
FOSTER

CARE INCALIFORNIA 7 (2003) (explaining that the California legislature and governor have
considered, since 1999, over one hundred bills and enacted more than forty pieces of
legislation intended to address deficiencies in the child welfare system).
8 FOSTER, supra note 5, at 31 ("It costs federal, state, and county government over $1.5
billion for foster care administration and payments each year. An additional $500 million
annually goes to child Welfare services for children in foster care and their families each
year. Billions are also spent through other systems for health and mental health care, special
education, court administration, substance abuse treatment and other services used by foster
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deficiencies of the system, at least in part, to the failure of child service
9
agencies and caseworkers to follow the California Legislature's mandate.
While systemic reasons may exist for these failings,10 the perception that social
workers, at times, are "not doing their jobs" raises an important question. When
should a government be liable for a social worker's negligent placement or
supervision of a child in foster care?
The answer to this question was, at one time, settled. Under the California
Tort Claims Act, 11 a government could be held liable in two ways: directly and
children."); LITTLE HOOVER COMM'N, supra note 7, at 2 (noting that the 2002-03 budget for
foster care services was $2.2 billion); see also CAL. DEP'T OF Soc. SERVS., PROGRAM
ALLOCATION AND EXPENDITURES REPORT FROM FISCAL YEAR 2001/2002 6 (2002) (listing
Child Welfare Services allocation and expenditures by county); ESTIMATES BRANCH, CAL.
DEP'T OF Soc. SERVS., ESTIMATES ALLOCATION TABLE 2002-2003, GOVERNOR'S BUDGET,
MAY 2003 REVISE (released Aug. 2003). For a discussion of the costs of operating the child
welfare system on the national level, see Mark E. Courtney, The Costs of Child Protection in
the Context of Welfare Reform, FUTURE OF CHILDREN, Spring 1998, at 88 (1998).
92000 AUDIT OF PROTECTIONS, supra note 4, at 7; see also Troy Anderson, 500 FosterKids
Missing, L.A. DAILY NEWS, Oct. 10, 2002, at N13 (reporting that Department of Children
and Family Services is unable to locate approximately five hundred foster children in its
custody); Anderson, supra note 6 (describing a foster care crisis where social workers are
"overlooking the warning signs of many children in the community in real danger and are
not able to properly ensure the safety of children in foster care"); Carla Rivera, State Moves
to Shut Down Foster Family Agency, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2003, at B3 (reporting that state
authorities moved to revoke the license of an agency alleged to have failed to ensure the
health and safety of more than one hundred children under its supervision; claims included
that the agency allowed unqualified staff members to evaluate potential foster families,
failed to properly perform criminal background checks, and failed to report sexual abuse in
timely fashion); Cheryl Romo, Everyone Seemed to Know Breanna and Joan Were in
Danger, Except Those Charged with Guarding Them, L.A. DAILY J., Jan. 5, 2001, at 1
(reporting the deaths of two foster children and the failings of the system); cf LITTLE
HOOVER COMM'N, supra note 7, at 8-11 (noting lack of supervision and leadership is root
cause of "dysfunctional" foster care system).
10Commentators generally believe that social workers are overburdened with large caseloads
because of underfunding. REED & KARPILOW, supra note 5, at 25; see also CAL. DEP'T OF
Soc. SERVS., SB 2030 CHILD WELFARE SERVICES WORKLOAD STUDY: FINAL REPORT 143-60

(2000) (discussing findings on worker caseload and outlining recommendations). Although
progress has been made in recent years and caseloads are diminishing, underfunding is
sometimes offered as an explanation or justification for a social worker's negligence. Id. But
the issue of governmental liability is separate and distinct from the issue of whether
underfunding historically has caused the foster care system to fail. See Salameda v. INS, 70
F.3d 447, 452 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating that "understaffing is not a defense" to an agency's
violation of a law); Scott v. County of Los Angeles, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 643, 654 (Ct. App.
1994) ("Financial limitations of governments have never been, and cannot be, deemed an
excuse for a public employee's failure to comply with mandatory duties imposed by law.");
cf Robbins v. Superior Court, 695 P.2d 695, 707 (Cal. 1985) ("This court is not unmindful
of the budgetary constraints facing counties. Nonetheless, financial considerations cannot
justify an infringement of a basic constitutional right .. ").
See generally Richard J. Pierce,
Jr., Judicial Review of Agency Actions in a Period of Diminishing Agency Resources, 49
ADMIN. L. REV. 61, 63 (1997) (analyzing the issue of agency resource constraints and the
need for agencies to adhere to administrative law).
" CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 810-996.6 (West 1995 & Supp. 2004).
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derivatively. Direct liability, on the one hand, existed when a social worker or
social service agency failed to follow the state statutes and regulations
concerning foster care placement.1 2 In those situations, the government was
negligent per se, and if that negligence proximately caused the child's injuries,
the foster child would recover. Derivative liability, on the other hand, existed
when a social worker was negligent in supervising a foster child's placement,
and the child was harmed as a result of that negligence. 13 Social workers were
generally not entitled to governmental immunity because immunity extended
only to basic policy decisions, and foster child care and supervision was not
considered a policy decision.1 4 But in recent years, the California courts have
retreated from this settled law.
In 2002, the Second District Court of Appeal in Los Angeles County v.
Superior Court (In re Terrell R.)-in a radical departure from prior law-

interpreted the California Tort Claims Act, along with the statutory provisions
governing foster care placement, so narrowly that governmental immunity
15
would now appear inevitable in any case alleging foster child mistreatment.
The court reached its decision after concluding that the statutory provisions
governing foster care placement were not intended to protect children from
abuse. 16 The court further held that a social worker not only has discretion to
determine where to place a dependent child, but also has discretion to ignore
statutorily mandated procedures in making that decision. 17 The reasoning of
that case, if followed, in conjunction with the federal courts' traditional
unwillingness to entertain claims under the federal civil rights laws, 18 would
12

Id. § 815.6 (West 1995); see generally Johnson v. State, 447 P.2d 352, 359-63 (Cal. 1968)
(finding state liable for parole officer's failure to warn of foster child's violent tendencies).
13CAL. GOv'T CODE § 820.2; see, e.g., Elton v. County of Orange, 84 Cal. Rptr. 27, 30 (Ct.
App. 1970).
14Elton, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 30; see also Nunn v. State, 677 P.2d 846, 849-50 (Cal. 1984) (en
banc); Johnson, 447 P.2d at 360.
15County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (Terrell R.), 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 637 (Ct. App.
2002), reh'g denied, 2002 Cal. App. LEXIS 4872 (Ct. App. Oct. 18, 2002), rev. denied, 2002
Cal. LEXIS 8629 (Dec. 18, 2002).
16Id. at 645-47.
17id.

18See, e.g., Babcock v. Tyler, 884 F.2d 497, 503-04 (9th Cir. 1989), overruling recognized
by Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 896-900 (9th Cir. 2003). Prior to July 2003, the Ninth
Circuit provided absolute immunity for state social workers involved in child welfare
proceedings. Federal relief may be available now that the Ninth Circuit no longer confers
absolute immunity on social worker placement and supervision decisions. But even still, a §
1983 claim-requiring proof that the social worker was recklessly indifferent to wellestablished law-will provide an abused foster child relief in only the most egregious of
cases. See generally Daniel J. Skoler, A ConstitutionalRight to Safe FosterCare?-Timefor
the Supreme Court to Pay Its I.O.U., 18 PEPP. L. REV. 353, 367 (1991) (describing the
consequences of Babcock); Christine M. Dine, Comment, Protecting Those Who Cannot
Protect Themselves: State Liabilit , for Violation of Foster Children's Right to Safety, 38
CAL. W. L. REv. 507, 509-10 (2002) (reviewing liability issues for foster care child abuse
under federal law).
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mean that children abused or neglected in the California foster care system
would face formidable-if not insurmountable-barriers to obtaining legal
redress for their injuries.
The Terrell R. case has enormous practical significance. Although
numerous lawsuits are brought, very few foster care intentional abuse cases
result in published opinions. In the last thirty years, only a handful of California
decisions have directly addressed the governmental liability issue in the context
of negligent foster care placement and supervision.' 9 Because of the dearth of
decisions, every published decision takes on unusual significance. Anecdotal
evidence suggests that based on the reasoning of Terrell R., private
practitioners are more unwilling than ever to serve as attorneys for foster
children when the suit involves a claim of foster parent abuse, because the
chances of succeeding on such claims are perceived as remote. Government

attorneys, on the other hand, now routinely bring demurrers asserting that they
owe no duties, mandatory or otherwise, to foster children. The Terrell R.
decision was so significant that, less than a year after it was decided, legislation

was proposed and then passed to specifically address it.2 1 Although this recent
legislation now purports to limit the impact of Terrell R., it does not explain
how the Terrell R. court erred. 22 Nor does the recent legislation indicate how a
court can, in the future, avoid the mistakes the Terrell R court made. 23 This
Article addresses these issues.
This Article examines the status of governmental liability under the
California Tort Claims Act for a social worker's negligent placement or
negligent supervision of a foster child and explains why Terrell R. was wrongly
decided. Part I describes the California foster care system and the significant
challenges it faces, which make the governmental liability issue an important
one. Part II examines the California Tort Claims Act, describes when a
19See, e.g., Becerra v. County of Santa Cruz, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 165 (Ct. App. 1998); Scott v.
County of Los Angeles, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 643 (Ct. App. 1994); Elton, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 27.
20No studies or statistics are available. Conversations, in August 2003, with individuals at
the Los Angeles County Bar Association, the Los Angeles County Dependency Court, and
child advocacy groups, as well as with private practitioners, suggest that Terrell R. has made
it extremely difficult for injured foster children to obtain recourse from counties.
21As a result of the Terrell R. case, child advocate groups immediately proposed legislation
to minimize the effect of that decision's holding. A version of that legislation was recently
passed. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 16000.1 (West Supp. 2004) (entitled "[liegislative

findings and declarations; intent; duty to care for and protect children in foster care"); see
also Duty to Foster Children Reaffirmation Act, ch. 847, 2003 Cal. Stat.; A.B. 1151, 200304 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2003); Foster Care: Hearing on A.B. 1151 Before the
Assemb. Comm. on the Judiciary,2003-04 Gen. Assem. (Cal. 2002) (synopsis of bill).
22CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 16000.1(a)(3)-(b)(1) (explaining that "nothing in this section
is intended to increase or decrease the liability of the state as it existed prior to the [Terrell R.
case]
. . It is the intent of the Legislature that nothing in the decision of the California
Court of Appeal in [Terrell R.] shall be held to change the standards of liability and
immunity for injuries to children in protective custody that existed prior to that decision.");
see
also Duty to Foster Children Reaffirmation Act; Cal. A.B. 1151.
23
See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 16000.1.
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governmental entity may face liability, and discusses the competing policies at
play in determining governmental liability questions. Part III analyzes the
history of governmental liability and immunity in the foster care context,
leading up to the recent decision in Terrell R. Part III argues that Terrell R.
misapplied the California Tort Claims Act, misconstrued the child welfare
statutes, and ignored binding precedent to effectively provide governmental
actors absolute immunity in foster care placement and supervision.
Specifically, the Terrell R. court reached that result by confusing and conflating
two separate statutory bases for liability. The Article then explains how this
move to absolute immunity, whether done intentionally or unintentionally, not
only contradicts sound public policy, but is a result long rejected by the
California Legislature and the California Supreme Court. Finally, in Part IV,
this Article explores how a typical negligent placement or negligent supervision
claim should be resolved. The Article explains why immunity is generally
inappropriate in cases where the foster child is intentionally abused by the
foster parents. The Article concludes that the courts must uphold the state of the
law before Terrell R., as set forth by the landmark California Supreme Court
case Johnson v. State of California.24 If a social worker negligently places or
negligently supervises a child in foster care, and the child is then physically or
sexually abused as a result of that negligence, liability is the rule, not the
exception.
I.

AN OVERVIEW: CALIFORNIA'S FOSTER CARE SYSTEM

The issue of governmental liability is significant in the foster care context
because all too often foster children are harmed by their foster parents.
Although the purpose of foster care is to protect children from abuse, the
system has often failed to achieve that goal, and is commonly described as
being "in crisis." Understanding both the purpose of the California foster care
system and its current crisis is thus essential to understanding the governmental
liability issues discussed in this Article.
A. Temporary Child Protection as a PrimaryPurpose ofFoster Care

Foster care exists to protect children when their parents can no longer
properly care for them. Parents have a liberty interest in the care, custody, and
raising of their children. 25 But in cases of child abuse, neglect, or abandonment,
24

Johnson v. State, 447 P.2d 352, 359-63 (Cal. 1968).
v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982); Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S.
18, 27 (1981); see also Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65-66 (2000) ("[T]he custody, care
and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom
include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder."); Smith v. Org.
of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 846 (1977) (explaining that the
Fourteenth Amendment gives biological parents a "constitutionally recognized liberty
25 Santosky
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a state has a compelling interest-if not a duty-to intervene. 26 A state has the
authority to protect children from abuse 27 under the doctrine of parens
patriae.28 When the government determines that a child is living in an abusive
home environment, the child may be removed and placed in the foster care
system.2 9

In California, as elsewhere, the foster care system is intended to provide a
temporary home-like setting to protect children who should not live with their
parents because of abuse, neglect or abandonment. 30 To this end, the
dependency laws embody three goals: "(1) to protect the child; (2) to preserve
the family and safeguard the parents' fundamental right to raise their child, as
long as these can be accomplished with safety to the child; and (3) to provide a
stable, permanent home for the child in a timely manner." 31 The foster care
interest" in the custody of their children "that derives from blood relationship, state law
sanction, and basic human right"); In re Lucero L., 998 P.2d 1019, 1032 (Cal. 2000) (finding
that a parent's desire for and right to "the companionship, care, custody and management of
his or her children" is an important interest that undeniably warrants deference and, absent a
powerful countervailing interest, protection (quoting Santosky, 455 U.S. at 758-59)); In re
Sade C., 920 P.2d 716, 737 (Cal. 1996) (explaining that parents have a fundamental liberty
interest in the care and custody of their children).
26 See generally Besharov, supra note 6; cf Deshaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc.
Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195-98 (1989) (holding that no legal duty exists for a state to protect a
child not in its custody from parental abuse, but suggesting a duty might exist when the state
takes a child into its custody).
27 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165-67 (1944); see generallyBesharov, supra note
6, at 509-40 (describing liability against caseworkers for failure to protect children as arising
from three sources-tort negligence, statutory mandate, and federal civil rights law); Richard
J. Gelles & Ira Schwartz, Children and the Child Welfare System, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 95,
96-97 (1999); Kristen L. Davenport, Note, Due Process-Claims of Abused Children
Against State ProtectiveAgencies-The State's Responsibility After Deshaney v. Winnebago
County Department of Social Services, 19 FLA. ST.U. L. REv. 243, 246-47 (1991).
28Parens patriae, which means "parent of the country," is defined as the government's
power and responsibility to protect and care for those citizens who cannot take care of
themselves, such as infants. See generally Natalie Loder-Clark, Parens Patriae and a
Modest Proposal for the Twenty-First Century: Legal Philosophy and a New Look at
Children's Welfare, 6 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 381 (2000).

29 See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 767 (interpreting state social services law and finding state's
interest in finding a child a new home arises only "when it is clear that the natural parent
cannot or will not provide a normal family home for the child") (quoting N.Y. Soc. SERV.
LAW § 384-b.1.(a)(iv) (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982)); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 649
(1972); In re Sade C., 920 P.2d at 737; see also In re Marilyn H., 851 P.2d 826, 833 (Cal.
1993) ("Although a parent's interest in the care, custody and companionship of a child is a
liberty interest that may not be interfered with in the absence of a compelling state interest,
the welfare of a child is a compelling state interest that a state has not only a right, but a
duty, to protect.") (internal citations omitted). In addition to being placed in foster family
homes or with foster family agencies, children may be placed in: (1) emergency public
shelters; (2) homes of relatives; or (3) group homes or residential treatment centers. FOSTER,
supra
note 5, at 20-24.
30
CAL. FAM. CODE § 7950 (West Supp. 2004).
31In re Santos Y., 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 692, 727 (Ct. App. 2001) (discussing the three primary
goals of the dependency system and citing to the relevant statutes). Child protection is a key
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system thus "removes the child from the natural home situation while
deficiencies are being corrected or arrangements are made for a change in
parental responsibility." 32 Once placed in foster care, the foster parents provide
day-to-day care, but the child welfare agency retains 33general power over a
child's life and "in effect, supervises the foster parents."
This degree of supervision is significant because of the California foster
care system's size. Almost 90,000 children-approximately one out of every
hundred-are in foster care. 34 California is one of eleven states operating on a
state-supervised, but county-administered, model of governance. 35 Fifty-eight
county welfare departments administer the system under the authority of the
California Department of Social Services. The37 2002-2003 budget for foster
care services in California exceeded $2.2 billion.
B. A System In Crisis
Despite the foster care system's goals, the system has often failed to
protect children from abuse. The system is in crisis. Known as a "broken" and
"costly" system, 38 "it is the overwhelming consensus of policymakers,
child
welfare administrators, service providers, parents, and current and former foster
39
youth" that the foster care system needs "to be fixed.,
As an initial matter, foster care is often not the intended sanctuary from
abuse. On a national level, the statistics paint a troubling picture. The "rates of
abuse and neglect of children in foster care may be greater than those in the
general population." 40 In some extreme cases, a child may be at greater risk of

goal of the dependency laws. See, e.g.,

CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 202, 300.2, 361(c)(1),
361.2(a), 361.3(a)(8), 366.21(e), 16000.
32 Skoler, supra note 18, at 356; see also FOSTER, supra note 5, at 7 (arguing that the purpose
of the foster care system is thus to "keep children safe while child welfare services are
provided so they can be reunited with their families").
33Skoler, supranote 18, at 358.

34FOSTER, supra note 5, at 7; see also REED & KARPILOW, supra note 5,
at 16-17 (finding

that 91,951 children were in supervised foster care in California as of April 2002); Child
Welfare Research Ctr., Child Welfare Supervised Foster Care Highlights from CWS/CMS,
at 1,available at http://cssr.berkeley.edu/cwscmsreports/Pointintime/fostercare/childwel/
arcAgeEthnic.asp (Jan. 2003) (noting that as of January 1, 2003, 89,210 children were in
child-welfare supervised foster care).
35REED & KARPILOW, supra note 5, at
5.
362000 AUDIT OF PROTECTIONS, supra note 4, at i; REED &KARPILOW, supra note 5, at 5.
37Letter from the Little Hoover Commission to Governor Gray Davis and Members
of the
California Legislature 2 (Feb. 4, 2003) (on file with author); see also supra note 8.
38
LITTLE HOOVER COMM'N, supra note 7, at 2.
39 FOSTER, supra note 5, at 8; see also Letter from the Little Hoover
Commission to
Governor Gray Davis and Members of the California Legislature, supra note 37, at 1 ("[T]he

foster care system fumbles forward, and often backward, and costs children and families
their happiness, their prosperity and even their lives.").

40 Timothy Arcaro, Florida'sFosterCare System Fails Its Children, 25 NOVA L. REv. 641,
647 (2001) (citing Roger J.R. Levesque, The Failures of Foster Care Reform:
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harm once they enter foster care than they would be if they remained with their
abusive parents.41 In New York City, a study concluded that foster care
children were one and one-half times more likely to suffer abuse and neglect
than children in the general population. 42 Likewise, a Baltimore study of 149
cases, based on the social service agency's own records, found that 28% of the
children had been abused while in foster care. 4 3 One commentator, after
studying foster care nationally, concluded that "43% of [the foster children] had
been placed in an unsuitable foster home, and that 57%... were at serious risk
of harm.. ..'4
Statistics for the number of abused or neglected 45 children in the California
foster care system, however, are substantially higher than national foster care
averages.46 According to a report released in January 2003 by the United States
Department of Health and Human Services, the incidence of child maltreatment

Revolutionizing the Most Radical Blueprint, 6 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1, 7 (1994);
Skoler, supra note 18, at 356); see also Kay P. Kindred, Of Child Welfare Reform: The
Implicationsfor Children When ContradictoryPolicies Collide, 9 WM. & MARY J.WOMEN
& L. 413, 461-63 (2003) (discussing study by the National Foster Care Education Project
showing that "children in foster care are at a much greater risk of maltreatment than are
children in the population at large").
41 Arcaro, supra note 40, at 647 ("The latest national data on child abuse fatalities suggest
that a child is nearly three times more likely to die of abuse in foster care than in the general
population."); Timothy J. Courville, Note, Governmental Liability for Failure to Prevent
ChildAbuse: A Rationalefor Absolute Immunity, 27 B.C. L. REV. 949,984 (1986) ("Because
of the many problems associated with foster care, some clinicians have concluded that
placing a child in a foster home is often more harmful to a child than the original home
situation may have been.") (citing Douglas J.Besharov, Child Protection: Past Progress,
Present Problems, and Future Direction, 17 FAM. L.Q. 151, 154 (1983)); Letter from the
Little Hoover Commission to Governor Gray Davis and Members of the California
Legislature, supra note 37, at 2 (noting that in California, "in some extreme but intolerable
cases, the level of care [in the foster care system] is no better than the abusive homes from
which those children were rescued"); see also CAL. DEP'T OF SOC. SERVS., REPORT TO THE
LEGISLATURE ON INVESTIGATION OF COMPLAINTS AGAINST CERTIFIED FAMILY HOMES AND
FOSTER FAMILY AGENCIES

16-19, 32 (2001) (detailing the complaints of physical abuse,

sexual abuse, and neglect, among other things, against certified family homes between
January 1, 2000 and December 31, 2000). But see Gelles & Schwartz, supra note 27, at 107
(explaining that some research shows that "children who reside in foster care fare neither
better nor worse than children who remain in homes in which maltreatment occurred").
42Dine, supra note 18, at 509-10.
41 Id. at 510 (citing BRENDA ScoTr, OUT OF CONTROL: WHO'S WATCHING OUR CHILD
PROTECTION AGENCIES 112 (1994)).
44Michael B. Mushlin, Unsafe Havens: The Case for Constitutional Protection of Foster
Childrenfrom Abuse and Neglect, 23 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 199, 207 (1998).
45Child abuse and neglect are defined by section 11165.1 of the California Penal Code and

section 300 of the California Welfare and Institutions Code. In California, abuse includes
physical abuse, sexual abuse, emotional abuse, general neglect, severe neglect, and
exploitation, including sexual exploitation. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11165.1 (West Supp. 2004);
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 300 (West Supp. 2004); see also REED & KARPILOW, supra note
5, at 9.
46
FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 2 1.
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47
in California foster care is almost twice the national average. The rate of
recurrence for substantiated child maltreatment within six months was also

57% greater in California than nationally.48 In July 2003, the Director of the
Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services conceded
that children in the Los Angeles County foster care system were abused or
neglected in almost 16% of the certified foster homes: a rate higher than almost
anywhere in the nation.49 One recent study concluded that a child is "up to ten
in Los Angeles County foster
times more likely to die from abuse or neglect"
50
nation.
the
in
place
other
any
in
than
care
Not only does the foster care system fail to provide safe sanctuary, it is also
not, as intended, a temporary home. 5t Too often the stay is permanent. By
52
statute, children ought to remain in foster care for no longer than a year, but
47Id. at 2 (noting that the incidence of maltreatment of children in foster care for the fiscal

year 2000, as reported in the state data profile, was 1.06% as compared to a national standard
of 0.57% or less); see also U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILD WELFARE
OUTCOMES 2000: ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS (2000).
48FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 2 (observing that the recurrence rate for substantiated child
maltreatment within six months for the fiscal year 2000 was 10.7%, compared to a national
standard
of 6.1%).
49
Troy Anderson, L.A. FosterAbuse Rate High, L.A. DAILY NEWS, July 23, 2003, at N3; see
also Troy Anderson, New Foster Chief Unveils Strategy, L.A. DAILY NEWS, Mar. 26, 2003,
at N3 [hereinafter New Foster Chief Unveils Strategy] (quoting David Sanders, director of
the Los Angeles County Department of Child and Family Services, who stated that "the
number of kids that appear to get hurt after the department gets involved in their lives is way
too high"); Troy Anderson, Public Hearings Sought on Foster Care System, L.A. DAILY
NEWS, Jan. 14, 2004, at N5 (noting prior Daily News estimates that up to half of the 75,000
children in the Los Angeles County child protective system and adoptive homes were
needlessly placed in a system that is often more dangerous than their own homes).
50Anderson, supra note 9; see also Troy Anderson, Foster Care Cash Cow, L.A. DAILY
NEWS, Dec. 7, 2003, at Nl (citing government statistics showing that the "hundreds of
thousands of children who have cycled through the county's system over the years are six to
seven times more likely to be mistreated and three times more likely to be killed than
children in the general population," and noting that over 660 children have died in the Los
Angeles County foster care system since 1991); Cheryl Romo, L.A. Ranks First by Far in
Foster-CareAbuse, L.A. DAILY J., Aug. 7, 2002, at A1 (discussing that rates of abuse in Los
Angeles County are significantly higher than national rates).
51The "average stay in foster care has risen over the past fifteen years with many children
spending more than two years in care on a national level .... Arcaro, supra note 40, at 647;
see also New Foster Chief Unveils Strategy, supra note 49 (quoting director of Los Angeles
County Department of Child and Family Services stating that "kids are in foster care for too
long"). See generally LITTLE HOOVER COMM'N, supra note 7, at 2; Robert M. Gordon,
Drifting Through Byzantium: The Promise and Failure of the Adoption and Safe Families
Act of 1997, 83 MINN. L. REV. 637 (1999).
52Reunifications with family or permanency hearings are required to occur within twelve
months of a child's entry into foster care. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 361.5 (West Supp.
2004); CAL. R. CT. 146 1; see also REED & KARPILOW, supra note 5, at 11-12 (discussing case
resolution times and deadlines for holding permanency hearings); FINAL REPORT, supra note
3, at 7 (observing that the percentage of reunifications in California occurring within twelve
months of entry into foster care (53.2%) did not meet the national standard of 76.2% or
more).
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more than one in four children remain in care longer than three and a half
years. 53 And the problem is expected to worsen. Although the number of
children in foster care declined between 1998 and 2002, 54 experts expect a new
55
trend of an increasing number of children to enter the system.
Other problems exist, too. An estimated 25% of California foster care
children do not receive timely medical care, and almost 50% do not receive
appropriate mental health services. 56 Upon leaving the California foster care
system, approximately 33% of the children fail to complete high school, 33%
spend time on welfare, 25% are arrested and spend time in jail, nearly 50% are
unemployed, and almost 25% become homeless. 57 A University of Wisconsin
study, from the late 1990s, reached similar conclusions when studying the
foster care system nationally. That study found that after leaving foster care,
27% of males were incarcerated within twelve to eighteen months, 50% were
unemployed, 37% did not graduate from high school, 33% were on public
assistance, 47% were receiving counseling or medication for medical problems
just before leaving the system, 58 and 33% were diagnosed with three or more
59
psychiatric problems.
In part, the foster care system's problems are attributable to social workers
failing to follow basic mandatory foster care requirements, such as a case plan,
periodic reviews, and permanency hearings. 60 A 2000 Federal Audit of the
California foster care system found that federal and state requirements were
consistently not met and significant systemic problems existed. After
53LITTLE HOOVER COMM'N, supra note 7, at 2; see also Jim Moye & Roberta Rinker, It's a
Hard Knock Life: Does the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 Adequately Address
Problems in the Child Welfare System?, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 375, 376 (2002) (noting that

in
1998, foster care children spent an average of three years in foster home care).
54

Child Welfare Research Ctr., supra note 34, at 1.
Now IN OUR HANDS: CARING FOR CALIFORNIA'S ABUSED &
NEGLECTED CHILDREN 23 (1999) (projecting the active foster care population to rise to
167,000 by 2005, assuming the caseload grows at the same rate as in the last eight years).
56 Letter from the Little Hoover Commission to Governor Gray Davis and Members of
the
California
Legislature,
supra
note
37,
at
2.
57
LITTLE HOOVER COMM'N, supra note 7, at 5; see also FOSTER, supra note 5, at 29.
58 Moye & Rinker, supra note 53, at 377 (citing Barbara Vobejola, At 18, It's Sink
or Swim,
WASH. POST,July 21, 1998, at Al).
59Id. (citing Susan DosReis et al., Mental Health Services for Youths in Foster Care and
DisabledYouths, 91 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1094 (2001)).
602000 AUDIT OF PROTECTIONS, supra note 4, at i, 7-8, 11-12, 13-14.
61Id. at 4. As a result of a January 2003 review by the U.S. Department of Child and Family
Services, the federal authorities threatened to withhold $18 million unless California
submitted a detailed plan to improve its child care services. Carla Rivera, State's Plan to
Upgrade Foster Care Approved, L.A. TIMES, June 26, 2003, at B8. The media has recently
spotlighted other problems with California's foster care system. See, e.g., Troy Anderson,
257 Children Missing in Three Months, L.A. DAILY NEWS, May 6, 2003, at N4 (noting that
759 foster children are listed as missing, and 257 children ran away or were abducted in the
first three months of 2003); Sue Fox, Audits Find Abuses in Foster Care Finances, L.A.
TIMES, July 15, 2003, at B1 ("Millions of taxpayer dollars meant to recruit and train foster
55 LITTLE HOOVER COMM'N,
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reviewing eighty-one foster care cases from seven counties, the Audit found:
• Fifty-eight of the eighty-one cases did not have case plans that
met federal or state requirements, while the remaining twenty62
three had no case plan at all.
* The periodic reviews of seventy-six out of eighty cases
studied were deficient: most reviews were either not held on a
63
timely basis, or not held at all.
* The permanency hearings for forty-seven of the fifty-two
hearings, failed to comply with
cases that required such
64
statutory requirements.
Even the Department of Children and Family Services admits that social
workers spend insufficient time with the foster children they are meant to
65

protect.

The need for social workers to carefully supervise foster children because
of the dangers of foster parent abuse is well understood: the problem of abuse
in the California foster care system has received significant attention. 66 Inthe
past few years, more than a dozen reports from various governmental and
nongovernmental organizations have documented the California foster care

parents in Los Angeles County have instead been spent on country club memberships, trips
to Disney World, luxury cars, a new office building, and the management of a clothing
shop.").
62 2000 AUDIT OF PROTECTIONS, supra note 4, at 7.
63Id. at 8, 12-13 (explaining that of the eighty cases studied: (1) in eight cases no periodic
reviews were held; (2) in twenty other cases there was one or more instances in which the
required periodic review was not held; and (3) in thirty-seven cases one or more of the
periodic
reviews were not held in a timely manner).
64
id.

65 Anderson, supra note 61 (quoting the director of the Los Angeles County Department of
Child and Family Services, who stated that "social workers need to spend more time with
foster children and develop relationships with them so they can spot the early signs of
trouble").
66 See supra notes 1-2; see, e.g., Fox, supra note 61 (discussing recent Los Angeles County
foster care finance audits); Jason B. Johnson, Foster CareFails State Kids, S.F. CHRON., Jan.
14, 2003, at A15, available at 2003 WL 3745763 (noting that the U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services has given California's Department of Social Services ninety days to
start making improvements or face monetary sanctions); Erin McCormick, Alarming
Breakdowns in State FosterCare, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 1, 2002, at Al, available at 2002 WL
4037015 (discussing statistics and problems with California's foster care system); Gayle
Pollard-Terry, Advice from Someone Who's Been There, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2003, at E l
(discussing film about Antwone Fisher, who was sexually abused and beaten while in
California's foster care system); Rivera, supra note 61 (discussing the federally approved
plan to improve California's child welfare services); Romo, supra note 9 (discussing the
death of two children pushed to death from ninth floor of courthouse by their mother);
Cheryl Romo, Misty, Who Got No Breaks, L.A. DAILY J., Nov. 12, 2002, at I (detailing
horrific account of a rape of a foster child with Down's syndrome); Matthew B. Stannard,
Judge Takes Responsibility in Death of Foster Child, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 4, 2003, at A19,
available at 2003 WL 3751984 (detailing a San Mateo County judge criticizing two social
workers' conduct and the county's child welfare agency recommending reforms).
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system's failings and have made recommendations for reform. 6 7 Between 1999
and 2002, the California Legislature considered over 100 bills intended to
address child welfare system deficiencies. 68 In the last four years, although the

number of foster children decreased,69 total funding for the child welfare

system increased by over $699 million. 70 At the same time, California state
agencies spent over $8
million in research in an attempt to understand the
71

failings of the system.
Although children abused in the foster care system are not without legal
recourse, their options are limited. 72 Federal constitutional claims under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, 73 until recently, were not viable in California. Before July 2003,
social workers in the Ninth Circuit were absolutely immune from federal suits
for failure to protect children from foster parent abuse.74 Although the law in
the Ninth Circuit appears to be changing,75 federal courts have been reluctant to
76
allow children to press federal claims when state law provides a remedy. In
67

See, e.g., CAL. DEP'T OF SOC. SERS., REEXAMINATION OF THE ROLE OF GROUP CARE IN A

FAMILY-BASED SYSTEM OF CARE (2001); CENTER FOR THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN, THE
FUTURE OF CHILDREN: PROTECTING CHILDREN FROM ABUSE AND NEGLECT (1998); FOSTER,
supra note 5 (2001); LITTLE HOOVER COMM'N, supra note 55, at 5. See generally LITTLE

HOOVER COMM'N, supra note 7, at 6.
68
LITTLE HOOVER COMM'N, supra note 7, at 7.

69 Child Welfare Research Ctr., supra note 34, at 1; see also supra notes 54-55 (discussing
the number of children in the foster care system).
70 FED. CHILD & FAMILY SERVS. REVIEW PROJECT,

STATE OF CALIFORNIA PROGRAM
IMPROVEMENT PLAN FOR THE CHILD WELFARE SERVICES PROGRAM 2 (2003).

71LITTLE HOOVER COMM'N, supra note 7, at 7.

72Realistically, a child will be unlikely to obtain meaningful relief from the foster parents
themselves. Often the foster parent is judgment-proof, and insurance will not cover abuse
claims, which involve intentional torts. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 1527-1527.3
(West 2000) (establishing Foster Care Fund, which will pay foster children claims on behalf
of foster family homes, but excludes claims based on criminal or intentional acts, such as
physical or sexual abuse). See generally Mushlin, supra note 44, at 250 (discussing the
inadequacy of damage remedies in foster care abuse cases).
" 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
74 See Babcock v. Tyler, 884 F.2d 497, 503-04 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding that state workers,
including the child welfare agency, are entitled to absolute immunity from liability for
placement in an abusive foster home), overruling recognized by Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d
889 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Meyers v. Contra Costa County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 812 F.2d
1154, 1158 (9th Cir. 1987); Camp v. Gregory, 67 F.3d 1286 (7th Cir. 1995). But see Norfleet
v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 989 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1993) (denying qualified immunity to
a Human Services director, a caseworker, and a foster care parent because a state has an
obligation to provide adequate medical care, protection, and supervision with respect to
children removed from parents and placed in foster homes). For a discussion of an apparent
circuit split as to whether a constitutional right to safe foster care placement exists, and the
difficulty in succeeding on such a claim, see Dine, supra note 18, at 513-15.
75 See Miller, 335 F.3d at 898-99 (recognizing the overturning of a decade of Ninth Circuit
law by holding that social workers are not entitled to absolute immunity).
76Since the landmark Supreme Court Deshaney case, claims against a social service agency
or a county for negligence in the placement or supervision of a child in foster care are often
brought under state tort law. Deshaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S.
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California, a state-law claim would be brought under the California Tort Claims
Act."
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND: THE CALIFORNIA TORT CLAIMS ACT

In 1963, the California Legislature enacted several statutory provisions that
78
have become known as the California Tort Claims Act. The Tort Claims Act
abolished absolute sovereign immunity and eliminated "all common law or
judicially declared forms of liability for public entities. . . ."79 As a result, since
8
1963, all government tort liability in California has been based on statute. 0 In
enacting the Tort Claims Act, the legislature carefully considered arguments for
why absolutely immunizing governments from liability could be justified for
public policy reasons - but ultimately rejected them.
A.

The Enactment of the Tort Claims Act And The Rejection of Absolute
Immunity

The 1960s marked the end of absolute governmental immunity in
California. Before then, government entities in California were generally
immune from liability for acts undertaken in a governmental capacity. 81 In
1961, however, two California Supreme Court decisions-Muskopf v. Corning
83
Hospital District82 and Lipman v. Brisbane Elementary School District _

189, 201 (1989) ("[Ilt may well be that, by voluntarily undertaking to protect Joshua against
a danger it concededly played no part in creating, the State acquired a duty under state tort
law to provide him with adequate protection against that danger."). See generally Margaret J.
Ryan, Comment, The Status of Civil Liability when Child Protection Workers Fail to Do
Their Jobs, 14 S.ILL. U. L.J. 573 (1990) (arguing that since Deshaney, a viable alternative to
bringing a federal action is to assert state law claims).
77CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 810-996.6 (West 1995 & Supp. 2004).
78This legislation became effective on September 20, 1963. Although the legislature did not
give a "short title" to these interrelated provisions, they are collectively known as the Tort
Claims Act. Michael J. v. Los Angeles County Dep't of Adoptions, 247 Cal. Rptr. 504, 507
(Ct. App. 1988). For a discussion of the six separate components of the Tort Claims Act, see
CEB, CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENT TORT LIABILITY PRACTICE § 2.5 (Lawrence M. Freiser et al.
eds., 3d ed. 1992) [hereinafter CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENT TORT LIABILITY PRACTICE].
79Becerra v. County of Santa Cruz, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 165, 168 (Ct. App. 1998) (quoting
Harshbarger v. City of Colton, 243 Cal. Rptr. 463, 465 (Ct. App. 1988)); see also Cochron v.
Herzog Engraving Co., 205 Cal. Rptr. 1, 3 (Ct. App. 1984).
80 CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 810-996.6 (West 1995 & Supp. 2004); see also Becerra, 81 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 168 (noting that liability may be based only on statute). See generally Elson v.
Public Utils. Comm'n, 124 Cal. Rptr. 305, 309-11 (Ct. App. 1975) (discussing the legislative
history behind the California Tort Claims Act).
81Elson, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 308 (citing Talley v. N. San Diego County Hosp. Dist., 257 P.2d

22 (Cal. 1953)). See generally Arvo Van Alstyne, Governmental Tort Liability: Judicial
Lawmaking in a StatutoryMilieu, 15 STAN. L. REV. 163 (1963).
82 359 P.2d 457 (Cal. 1961).
83 359 P.2d 465 (Cal. 1961).
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abolished sovereign immunity. In Muskopf the court proclaimed that the
doctrine of sovereign immunity was no longer available to protect public
entities from liability. 84 Instead, the Muskopf court held that "[g]ovemment
officials [would be] liable for the negligent performance of their ministerial
duties ...

but [would] not be liable for their discretionary acts ...

even if it is

alleged that they acted maliciously." 85 It found the "rule of governmental
immunity for tort [to be] an anachronism, without rational basis and [a rule that
had] existed only by the force of inertia.' ' 6 Likewise, the Lipman court
indicated that although government employees are entitled to immunity for
"discretionary" decisions, 87 public entities can be liable for their employees'
negligent operational and ministerial acts. 88
In response, the California Legislature enacted a moratorium statute
suspending the effect of these twin decisions to study the governmental
immunity issue. 89 The Legislature appointed a Law Revision Commission,
which recommended that public entities be held liable when an entity fails to
exercise reasonable diligence to comply with mandatory duties, and to the same
extent as its employees could be held liable.90 Although the Commission
acknowledged the need to limit governmental liability, it also recognized that
absolutely immunizing the government from any liability would be
unwarranted:
[I]t would be harsh and unjust to deny compensation to all persons injured as
the result of the wrongful or negligent acts or omissions of public employees.
Government operates for the benefit of all; hence, it is reasonable to expect
that all should bear some of the burden of the injuries that are wrongfully
inflicted by the government. 91
Consequently, the Law Review Commission recommended that the
legislature follow the lead set by Muskopf and Lipman and abolish absolute
84
Muskopf
85
id.
86

359 P.2d at 462-63.

Id. at 460 (citing Edwin M. Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34

YALE L.J. 1, 129,

229 (1924); James A. Casner & Edgar Fuller, Municipal Tort Liability in Operation, 54
HARV. L. REv. 437 (1941); John Repko, American Legal Commentary on the Doctrines of
Municipal
Tort Liability, 9 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 214 (1942)).
87
Lipman, 359 P.2d at 467.
88
1d. See generally Elson v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 124 Cal. Rptr. 305, 308 (Ct. App. 1975)

(discussing extensively the legislative history of the Tort Claims Act).
89 Brown v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 843 P.2d 624, 630 (Cal. 1993) (citing to the
Moratorium Act, ch. 1404, 1961 Cal. Stat. 3209); see also CAL. CIV. CODE § 22.3 (West
1982) (repealed 1979).
Cal. Law Revision Comm'n, Recommendations Relating to Sovereign Immunity, 4 CAL. L.
REvIsION COMMISSION REP. 801, 815-16 (1963); Nestle v. City of Santa Monica, 496 P.2d
90

480, 487-88, n.7 (Cal. 1972) (en banc) (explaining history of Tort Claims Act and Law
Review Commission studies); see also Van Arsdale v. Hollinger, 437 P.2d 508, 511 (Cal.
1968) (explaining that the recommendations of the Law Commission are entitled to
substantial weight in construing the meaning of the Tort Claims Act), overruled on other
grounds by Privette v. Superior Court, 854 P.2d 721 (Cal. 1993).
91Cal. Law Revision Comm'n, supra note 90, at 810; see also Elson, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 310.
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immunity.
B. Policy ConsiderationsUnderlying Governmental Tort Liability
The Legislature, in deciding whether to follow the Law Review
Commission recommendations, was acutely aware of the competing policies
that underlie governmental immunity issues. Understanding these policies is
necessary to understand what the Legislature intended when it enacted the Tort
Claims Act. The policies are also important because a court must focus on
92
act immunity applies.
policy considerations in deciding whether discretionary
1. Policiesfavoring immunity: separationofpowers and over deterrence.
Two policy rationales support granting governmental actors immunity from
tort claims. The first, and most often cited, rationale supporting limiting
governmental liability is separation of powers. 93 This policy is rooted in the
notion that the judiciary should not second-guess the decisions of 94a
agency).
governmental agency (here, the case worker or social service
Judicial policy making is inappropriate because "such judgments are more
92

Nunn v. State, 677 P.2d 846, 849 (Cal. 1984) (en banc); Sanborn v. Chronicle Publ'g Co.,
556 P.2d 764, 768-69 (Cal. 1976); see also Johnson v. State, 447 P.2d 352, 358 (Cal. 1968)
(eschewing a literal approach to defining "discretionary actions" and concentrating instead
on policy considerations relevant to the immunity claim). See generally CALIFORNIA
GOVERNMENT TORT LIABILITY PRACTICE, supranote 78, § 2.115 (noting that to determine the
scope of discretionary immunity "the judicial process must be focused principally on the
policy considerations relevant to the purpose of the immunity").
93 See Johnson, 447 P.2d at 360 (discussing separation of powers as a rationale for
governmental immunity); see also Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 648 (1980)
(reasoning that in context of municipal functions, protecting cities from suits challenging
discretionary decisions is based on "a concern for separation of powers .... For a court or
jury, in the guise of a tort suit, to review the reasonableness of the city's judgment on these
matters would be an infringement upon the powers properly vested in a coordinate and
coequal branch of government."); Kaisner v. Kolb, 543 So. 2d 732, 737 (Fla. 1989) (holding
that governmental immunity is derived entirely from the doctrine of separation of powers).
See generally Mark C. Niles, "Nothing But Mischief": The Federal Tort Claims Act and the
Scope of Discretionary Immunity, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 1275, 1308-15, 1337-43 (2002)
(discussing separation of powers as a justification for governmental immunity); Susan
Randall, Sovereign Immunity and the Uses of History, 81 NEB. L. REV. 1, 102-13 (2002)
(arguing that separation of powers is the only valid basis for governmental immunity); Laura
Huber Martin, Comment, Caseworker Liabilityfor the Negligent Handling of Child Abuse
Reports, 60 U. CtN. L. REV. 191, 217 (1991) (arguing that the "primary justification for
sovereign immunity is the separation of powers doctrine").
94
See, e.g., United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Arerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines),
467 U.S. 797, 814 (1984) (noting that governmental immunity for discretionary acts is
required to "prevent second-guessing of legislative and administrative decisions grounded in
[policy]"); see also Mauricia Allen, Note & Comment, The Georgia Tort Claims Act: .4
License.for Negligence in Child Deprivation Cases?, 18 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 795, 821-22
(2002).
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appropriately left to the political branches of our governmental system, and
because courts, which specialize in the resolution of discrete factual and legal
disputes, are not equipped to make broad policy judgments." 95 Basic policy
choices made by governmental agencies involve decisions concerning the use
of resources and the balancing of competing interests of various
constituencies. 96 Accordingly, there should be judicial abstention in areas
where the responsibility for basic policy decisions has been committed to a
97
coordinate branch of government.
A related, but different policy often urged to justify immunity, is that
government workers should be free to exercise their judgment without constant
fear of liability. With broad liability, public employees might be too cautious in
their decision-making:
The justification for [immunity] is that it is impossible to know whether the
claim is well-founded until the case has been tried, and that to submit all
officials, the innocent as well as the guilty, to the burden of a trial and to the
inevitable danger of its outcome, would dampen the ardor of all but the most
resolute, or the most irresponsible, in the unflinching discharge of their duties.
..In this instance it has been thought in the end better to leave unredressed

the wrongs done by dishonest officers than to subject those who try to do their
duty to the constant dread of retaliation.98
A governmental actor's knowledge that he or she could be subjected to
civil liability could also negatively affect his or her performance. 99 Without
some limitation on litigation, a government official may become "so inundated
95

96 Niles,

supra note 93, at 1308.

Nunn, 677 P.2d at 849; see also RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 895B cmt. d (1979)

(noting that the "allocation of [the] available resources [may] be treated as a matter of
political discretion" not subject to judicial review); Niles, supra note 93, at 1312 ("Policy
choices invariably involve decisions concerning the use of scarce and/or expensive
resources, and the balance of competing interests of various constituencies.").
97 Johnson, 447 P.2d at 361 n.8 (explaining that the purpose of immunity is "to insure
that
courts refuse to pass judgment on policy decisions in the province of coordinate branches of
government... [if] such a policy decision, consciously balancing risks and advantages, took
place."); see also Nunn, 677 P.2d at 849 (explaining that the "underlying reason for granting
immunity" is "to ensure judicial abstention" from interfering with policy-making committed
to
the executive branch).
98
Johnson, 447 P.2d at 358; accord Hardy v. Vail, 311 P.2d 494, 496-97 (Cal. 1957); Elson
v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 124 Cal. Rptr. 305, 309 (Ct. App. 1975) (quoting Gregoire v.
Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949)); see also Tenney v. Bradhove, 341 U.S. 367, 37377 (1951) ("[I1t is indispensably necessary, that [the government official] enjoy the fullest
liberty [and that he or she] be protected from the resentment of every one, however
powerful, to whom the exercise of that liberty may occasion offense."); Caldwell v.
Montoya, 897 P.2d 1320, 1324, 1326 (Cal. 1995) (noting the "vital public interest in
securing free and independent judgment" of public sector employees and that "fear of civil
lawsuits might deter officials from the zealous and unflinching discharge of their public
duties").
99 Niles, supra note 93, at 1307-08; see also Ronald A. Cass, Damage Suits Against Public
Officers, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 1110, 1153-54 (1981) (discussing the "over deterrence" impact
of personal liability for government officials).
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with civil claims that they would not be able to, or would at least be severely
handicapped in, performing their normal duties." 100 Accordingly, extensive
liability would over deter and foster inefficient or ineffective government.
Both policies, however, have limited, if any, application when mandatory
or non-policy-based decisions are involved. The separation of powers concern
does not apply when an employee departs from a statutorily mandated path or
performs an operational decision. 0 1 In such circumstances, a court is not
second-guessing a policy judgment. 0 2 Rather, the court is merely enforcing the
law. So too, the fear-of-liability/over deterrence rationale for limiting liability is
not often implicated. The Tort Claims Act provides substantial protection to

employees through indemnification (absent bad faith).'0 3 The Act also provides
employees a defense at public expense, when employees are sued for their
official acts or omissions.'0 4 These protections significantly reduce, if not

eliminate, the dangers perceived in chilling employee ardor. 1°5 Indeed, the
California Supreme Court has held that a governmental actor's fear of liability
can not serve as a reason for granting immunity. 106 It reaffirmed that holding as
recently as 2000. 107
2.

Policiesfavoring liability: deterrence,loss spreading,andfairness.

On the other hand, several policies favor imposing liability for a
100 Niles, supra note 93, at 1308 (citing Sigbert v. Gilley, 895 F.2d 797, 803-04 (D.C. Cir.
1990)); see also Cass, supra note 99, at 1153-60; Robert G. Shaffer, The Public Interest in
Private Party Immunity: Extending Qualified Immunity from 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 to
PrivatePrisons,45 DuKE L.J. 1049, 1059 (1996).
101Johnson, 447 P.2d at 361; cf United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 324 (1991) ("If the
employee violates the mandatory regulation, there will be no shelter from liability because
there is no room for choice and the action will be contrary to policy.").
102 Johnson, 447 P.2d at 361 (admonishing courts not to second-guess policy decisions of
other branches of government).
103 CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 825-825.6, 995-995.6 (West 1995 & Supp. 2004).
04

Id See generally CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENT TORT LIABILITY PRACTICE, supra note 78, §§

2.89-2.90, 6.143-6.156.

105 Johnson, 447 P.2d at 359.

1061d. at 360-61; Tarasoffv. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 350 n.21 (Cal. 1976)
("We dismissed, in Johnson, the view that immunity continues to be necessary in order to
insure that public employees will be sufficiently zealous in the performance of their official
duties. The California Tort Claims Act of 1963 provides for indemnification of public
employees against liability, absent bad faith, and also permits such employees to insist that
their defenses be conducted at public expense . . . Public employees thus no longer have a
significant reason to fear liability as they go about their official tasks. We also, in Johnson,
rejected the argument that a public employee's concern over the potential liability of his or
her employer serves as a basis for immunity.").
107 Barner v. Leeds, 13 P.3d 704, 713 (Cal. 2000) ("[Flears that personal exposure to damage
suits and judgments would deter the vigorous performance of public responsibilities are no
longer a policy basis for immunity.") (quoting Caldwell v. Montoya, 897 P.2d 1320 (Cal.
1995)); see also Ma v. City & County of San Francisco, 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d 544, 567 n.14 (Ct.
App. 2002) (rejecting litigation fear as a basis for granting immunity).
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government's negligent acts. The first is deterrence. Immunizing governmental
actors from liability would remove a critical check on governmental
behavior.10 8 The government -just like any private actor - will be more careful
10 9
and less likely to be negligent if forced to internalize the costs of its actions.
Potential liability also induces governmental workers to be more careful.
Failure to use care would result in the stigma of being found negligent and the
11 0
possibility of disciplinary action.
More fundamentally, finding government liability in certain circumstances
would further the traditional tort theory that a negligent actor should
compensate the innocent victim, and promotes goals of corrective and
distributive justice, loss spreading, and fairness.11 A government "is a more
appropriate candidate to bear the costs incurred by its negligent acts than the
private citizen who sustains an injury through no 'fault' of her own. ' Some
even argue that a government is an ideal tort defendant, because it has the
unique ability to spread losses arising from tort liability through taxes.11 3 The
108Harold J. Krent, Preserving Discretion Without Sacrificing Deterrence: Federal

Governmental Liability in Tort, 38 UCLA L. REv. 871, 885-907 (1991) (arguing that
narrowly construing immunities imposes a critical check against governmental wrongdoing
through deterrence).
109 Id. at 872 ("If the theory of tort law is in part to compel private entities to become more
efficient in light of potential tort liability, then there is no apparent reason why potential
liability should not similarly force the government to be more prudent in its operations.");
see also Allen, supra note 94, at 824 ("Like any private business, forcing the state (or
federal) government to internalize negligence costs creates incentives for the state to act
more safely.").
110Krent, supra note 108, at 886 ("Others may be motivated to avoid liability by more
personal incentives, whether to avoid the stigma of being found negligent or to avoid
possible disciplinary action by their superiors."). See generally Barry R. Goldman, Note,
Can the King Do No Wrong? A New Look at the DiscretionaryFunction Exception to the
Federal Tort Claims Act, 26 GA. L. REv. 837, 853-54 (1992) ("[T]he stigma attached to
creating liability for the agency might deter a government agent from actively promulgating
and enforcing contentious agency policies.").
111Niles, supra note 93, at 1294-95.
112 Id.; see also John C. Jeffries, Jr., Compensationfor Constitutional Torts: Reflections on
the Significance of Fault, 88 MICH. L. REv. 82 (1989) (discussing theories of distributive
justice and loss spreading in connection with governmental liability). Basic notions of
fairness dictate that innocent plaintiffs (whether they are children or adults) should not be
left without a remedy. The need to provide an innocent victim a remedy has long driven
courts' decisions. See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 936 (Cal. 1980) ("The
most persuasive reason for finding plaintiff states a cause of action is that advanced in
[Summers v. Tice]: as between an innocent plaintiff and negligent defendants, the latter
should bear the cost of the injury."); Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948) (holding that
negligent defendants should bear costs, not innocent plaintiffs); Kingston v. Chicago &
Northwestern Ry. Co., 211 N.W. 913 (Wis. 1927) (finding that the defendant railroad
company was liable for the entire damage to the plaintiffs property, even though but for the
defendant's negligence the plaintiffs property would have been destroyed anyway, because
to hold otherwise would allow a known wrongdoer to escape liability and leave an innocent
plaintiff without a remedy).
113James R. Levine, The Federal Tort Claims Act: A Proposalfor InstitutionalReform, 100
COLUM. L. REv. 1538, 1553 (2000) (arguing that the governmental budget should be
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California Supreme Court has recognized as much: "[I]t would be unjust in
some circumstances to require an individual injured by official wrongdoing to
bear the burden of his loss, rather than distribute it throughout the
community." 114 Indeed, as one California court has explained, notions of
fairness strongly dictate against granting governmental immunity:
This limitation upon immunities is manifestly just. An immunity is, after all, a
license to harm. Thus, it should not extend beyond those functions which are
so necessary to the public good that the public benefit from the free exercise
of discretion in such functions plainly outweighs the private harm that may
flow from misfeasance.'l 5
C. A Resolution Of The Policy Considerations:The Statutory Framework
In weighing these different policies, the Legislature attempted to strike a
balance with the California Tort Claims Act. But the balance is weighted
heavily in favor of liability. Where there is negligence, "liability for resulting
harm is the rule, and immunity is the exception."1 16 Accordingly, governmental
immunities must be "strictly construed."' 17 The burden is on the government to
prove that the immunity should be conferred. 118 The California Legislature's
resolution of the policy concerns resulted in a Tort Claims Act that was
intended to: (1) create liability on the part of governmental entities when injury
was caused by a failure to perform a mandatory duty; (2) abolish absolute
immunity and make public entities liable when their employees were liable;
and (3) continue the immunity granted to public employees for their policyadjusted to accommodate an expansion of tort liability to "'spread the loss caused by
government activity rather than leave the burden on the unlucky individuals harmed by the
government's negligence"); see also Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315, 319-20
(1957) (discussing the benefits of spreading the cost and burden of governmental liability
through taxes).
114 Lipman v. Brisbane Elementary Sch. Dist., 359 P.2d 465, 467 (Cal. 1961).
115 Scott v. County of Los Angeles, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 643, 653 (Ct. App. 1994).
116 Lopez v. S. Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 710 P.2d 907, 915 (Cal. 1985); accord Johnson v.
State, 447 P.2d 352, 363 (Cal. 1968); Muskopf v. Coming Hosp. Dist., 359 P.2d 457, 462
(Cal. 1961); Scott, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 652. See generally Ramos v. County of Madera, 484
P.2d 93, 98 (Cal. 1971) ("[Tlhe well-settled notion that in governmental tort cases, 'the rule
is liability, immunity is the exception' .

. .

. Unless the legislature has clearly provided for

immunity, the important societal goal of compensating injured parties for damages caused by
willful or negligent acts must prevail.").
"7 Scott, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 652 (citing Sullivan v. County of Los Angeles, 527 P.2d 865,
870-71 (Cal. 1974); James W. v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 169, 175-76 (Ct. App.
1993)).
1l8 Rodriguez v. Cal. Highway Patrol, 89 F. Supp. 2d 1131, 1138 (N.D. Cal. 2000) ("Under
California law, government defendants have the burden of proving that the actions of
government employees fall within scope of a statutory immunity."); Lopez, 710 P.2d at 916
(finding government "must make showing that act complained of was a policy decision that
consciously balance[d] risks and advantages") (quoting Johnson, 447 P.2d at 363); Bell v.
State, 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 541, 547 (Ct. App. 1998) (finding discretionary act immunity requires
"proof that the specific conduct that gave rise to the suit involved" a basic policy decision).
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119

based decisions.
Accordingly, under the California Tort Claims Act, a governmental entity,
such as a county or a social services agency, may be held liable in one of two
ways. First, a public entity may be directly liable if it fails to discharge a
mandatory duty. 12 1 Second, a public entity may be held derivatively liable for
the acts or omissions of its employees. 122 Derivative liability will not exist,
however, if the employee made a "discretionary," policy-based decision,
regardless of whether that employee was negligent. 123
1. A government is directly liablefor breach of mandatory duties.

The negligence per se doctrine applies to public entities. 124 Under section
815.6 of the California Government Code' 25 a three-pronged test applies to
determine whether a governmental entity is directly liable. First, the public
entity must be under a mandatory, not a discretionary, duty imposed by an
enactment.1 26 An "enactment" is defined to include constitutional provisions,
statutes, charter provisions, ordinances or regulations. 27 Second, the enactment
must be designed to protect against the risk of the particular kind of injury
suffered by the party seeking to impose liability. 28 A plaintiff must show that
the injury is "one of the consequences which the [enacting body] sought to
119
Elson v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 124 Cal. Rptr. 305, 311 (Ct. App. 1975) (concluding that
the Tort Claims Acts history makes the intent of the legislature clear); see also CAL. Gov'T
CODE
§ 820.2, legislative committee cmt. (West 1995).
120 CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENT TORT LIABILITY PRACTICE, supra note 78, § 2.53.
121 CAL. GOv'T CODE § 815.6 ("Where a public entity is under a mandatory duty imposed by
an enactment that is designed to protect against the risk of a particular kind of injury, the
public entity is liable for an injury of that kind proximately caused by its failure to discharge
the duty unless the public entity establishes that it exercised reasonable diligence to
discharge the duty.").
122 Id. § 815.2(a) ("A public entity is liable for injury proximately caused by an act or
omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his [or her] employment if
the act or omission would, apart from this section, have given rise to a cause of action
against that employee ....
").
123 Id. § 820.2 (stating that a public employee is not liable for an injury resulting from an act
or omission that was "the result of the exercise of the discretion vested in him [or her],
whether
or not such discretion be abused"); see also id. § 815.2.
124 Alejo v. City of Alhambra, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 768, 771 n.3 (Ct. App. 2000).

§ 815.6.

125

CAL. GOV'T CODE

126

Id.; see also Gray v. State, 254 Cal. Rptr. 581, 583 (Ct. App. 1989) (setting forth the

elements required to impose liability), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in
Braman v. State, 33 Cal. Rptr. 608, 609 (Ct. App. 1994); State v. Superior Court, 197 Cal.
Rptr. 914, 918 (Ct. App. 1984) (setting forth required elements of liability). See generally
Morris v. County of Marin, 559 P.2d 606 (Cal. 1977).
127 CAL. Gov'T CODE § 810.6.
128 Id. § 815.6 (imposing liability only when enactment "is designed to protect against the
risk of a particular kind of injury"); see also Haggis v. City of Los Angeles, 993 P.2d 983,
987-88 (Cal. 2000); Shelton v. City of Westminster, 188 Cal. Rptr. 2d 205, 211 (Ct. App.
1984).
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129
That the enactment
prevent through imposing the alleged mandatory duty."
is not enough; if
belongs
plaintiff
which
to
class
the
on
confers some benefit
cannot
enactment
the
purpose,
enactment's
the
to
the benefit is "incidental"
13 ° Third, the failure to diligently discharge that
serve as a predicate for liability.
3
mandatory duty must be a proximate cause of the injury suffered.1 ' The Tort
Claims Act thus "applies to public entities the familiar rule of tort law that
prescribed standard of care creates a rebuttable
violation of a legislatively 32
presumption of negligence."
California courts have struggled to define what a "mandatory duty" is.
Generally, however, a mandatory duty is understood to refer to an "obligatory
duty which a governmental entity is required to perform, as opposed to 33a
permissive power that such entity may or may not exercise, as it chooses."'
The controlling question is whether the legislature intended that the enactment
impose an obligation to take a specified action to prevent specific types of
injuries. 134 An enactment that contains mere recitations
of goals and policies
35
act.
to
duty
mandatory
a
impose
not
does
therefore
In determining whether a statute imposes a mandatory duty, established
principles of statutory interpretation must guide the court. Whether a
mandatory duty exists is a question of law for the courts to decide. 36 A court
must first determine legislative intent from the statutory language itself.137 Only

129 Haggis, 993 P.2d at 988 (quoting Hoffv. Vacaville Unified Sch. Dist., 968 P.2d 522 (Cal.
1998)).
130 Id.; Sutherland v. City of Fort Bragg, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 736, 741 (Ct. App. 2000).
131
Haggis, 993 P.2d at 988; see also Ibarra v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 227 Cal. Rptr. 371, 375
(Ct. App. 1986); State v. Superior Court, 197 Cal. Rptr. 914, 918 (Ct. App. 1984).
132 35 CAL. JuR. 3D Governmental Tort Liability § 11 (2002) (citing Lehto v. City of Oxnard,
217 Cal. Rptr. 450 (Ct. App. 1985)); see also CAL. EVID. CODE § 669 (codifying negligence
per se doctrine and creating rebuttable presumption of negligence when person violates "a
statute, ordinance, or regulation of a public entity").
133 35 CAL. JUR. 3D Governmental Tort Liability § 11; see also Morris v. County of Marin,
559 P.2d 606, 610 (Cal. 1977); Posey v. State, 225 Cal. Rptr. 830, 838 (Ct. App. 1986); Fox
v. County ofFresno, 216 Cal. Rptr. 879, 881 (Ct. App. 1985).
134 35 CAL. JUR. 3D Governmental Tort Liability § 11; see also Keech v. Berkeley Unified
School Dist., 210 Cal. Rptr. 7, 10 (Ct. App. 1984).
135Ibarra,227 Cal. Rptr. at 376; cf Searcy v. Hemet Unified Sch. Dist., 223 Cal. Rptr. 206,
211 (Ct. App. 1986) (finding enactments that are merely guidelines and advisory in nature do
not create mandatory duties).
136 Nunn v. State, 677 P.2d 846, 852 (Cal. 1984) (en banc); see also
Fox, 216 Cal. Rptr. at
881 (asserting that whether a statute or ordinance is intended to create a mandatory duty is a
question of law). In making a claim that a governmental entity has breached a mandatory
duty, the specific statute that imposes the mandatory duty must be specifically identified in
pleadings. Sullivan v. City of Sacramento, 235 Cal. Rptr. 844, 849 (Ct. App. 1987); Searcy,
223 Cal. Rptr. at 212.
"' Nunn, 677 P.2d at 851-52. In the absence of a clearly expressed legislative intent to the
contrary, the words of a statute are deemed conclusive. Halstrom v. Tillamook County, 493
U.S. 20, 28 (1989); see also People v. Woodhead, 741 P.2d 154, 157 (Cal. 1987)
("[S]ignificance should be attributed to every word and phrase of a statute, and a
construction making some words surplusage should be avoided.").
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when the statutory language is ambiguous may other factors be considered."'
The language of the statute need not, however, manifest a legislative intent to
create a private right of action.' 39 Rather, courts have held that a mandatory
duty exists so long as the duty is explicitly phrased in the enactment using
obligatory language, such as "shall" or "must." 140 Only in a narrow set of
14 1
circumstances is the presence of obligatory language not dispositive.
Notwithstanding the use of the term "shall" or "must," a mandatory duty will
not exist where the legislative intent is manifestly otherwise or where
interpreting the statute literally would lead to an absurdity. 12 Finally, because a
statutory provision creates a mandatory duty in one area143does not necessarily
mean it imposes a mandatory duty in another related area.
13

Nunn, 677 P.2d at 851-52.

139

Haggis v. City of Los Angeles, 993 P.2d 983, 988 (Cal. 2000) (noting that the enactment

establishing the mandatory duty does not need to manifest an intent to create a private right
of action because that is the function of section 815.6) (citing Crusader Ins. Co. v. Scottsdale
Ins. Co., 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 620, 623 (Ct. App. 1997)).
140 Morris v. County of Main, 559 P.2d 606, 610 (Cal. 1977); see CAL. GOV'T CODE § 14
(West 1995) (indicating that the word "shall" indicates mandatory, not permissive,
language); see also CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 19 (West 2003) ("'Shall' is mandatory and
'may' is permissive."); CAL. FAM. CODE § 12 (West 1994) ("'Shall' is mandatory and 'may'
is permissive. 'Shall not' and 'may not' are prohibitory."); Sullivan v. County of Los
Angeles, 527 P.2d 865, 867-68 (Cal. 1974) (interpreting statute using the word "must" to
impose a mandatory duty); Ramos v. County of Madera, 484 P.2d 93, 99-100 (Cal. 1971)
(finding that statutes using word "shall" regarding eligibility standards for government
payments created mandatory duties); Woodbury v. Brown-Dempsey, 134 Cal. Rptr. 2d 124,
133 (Ct. App. 2003) (explaining that "[ojrdinarily, the word 'may' connotes a discretionary
or permissive act; the word 'shall' connotes a mandatory or directory duty" and that "the
Legislature is presumably aware of the ordinary meaning assigned to the words 'may' and
'shall."'); Decker v. U.D. Registry, Inc., 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 892, 895-96 (Ct. App. 2003)
("Thus, 'in most cases,' the Legislature's use in a statute of the word 'shall' indicates that the
statute's 'provisions are mandatory ....')(quoting Abbett Electric Corp. v. Storek, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 845, 850-51 (Ct. App. 1994)); Judith P. v. Superior Court, 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d 14, 25
(Ct. App. 2002) (holding that statute providing that a status report "shall" be filed and served
at least ten days before status review hearing in dependency proceeding creates a mandatory
duty). See generally REA Enters. v. Cal. Coastal Zone Conservation Comm'n, 125 Cal.
Rptr. 201, 207-08 (Ct. App. 1975) (explaining that a "well established rule of statutory
construction" is that the word "shall" connotes mandatory action).
141
Morris, 559 P.2d at 612 n.6 ("Although statutory language is... a most important guide
in determining legislative intent, there are unquestionably instances in which other factors
will indicate that apparently obligatory language was not intended to foreclose ...[the]
exercise of discretion."); Estate of DePasse v. Harris, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 143, 151-52 (Ct.
App. 2002) ("Whether the words 'must' or 'shall' should be construed as mandatory or
directory depends on the intention of the Legislature in enacting the particular code
section.").
142See, e.g., Nunn, 677 P.2d at 851; Cancun Homeowners Ass'n v. City of San Juan
Capistrano, 264 Cal. Rptr. 288, 291 (Ct. App. 1989). See generally Creason v. Dep't of
Health Servs., 957 P.2d 1323, 1328 (Cal. 1998) (citing Morris, 559 P.2d at 612 n.6);
CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENT TORT LIABILITY PRACTICE, supra note 78, § 2.76 (listing cases

finding no mandatory duty despite use of the word "shall").
143 See, e.g., Becerra v. County of Santa Cruz, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 165, 170 (Ct. App. 1998)
(finding that mandatory duty to assess factors as part of county's foster care placement
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A government is derivatively liablefor its employees' negligence ifthe
employee is not immune.

In addition to direct liability, a government agency may also be
derivatively liable for its employees' acts or omissions, 144 provided that the
employee is not immune from liability. 145 Immunity exists for an employee's
146
"discretionary" acts committed within the scope of his or her employment.
As section 820.2 of the California Government Code explains, "[e]xcept as
otherwise provided by statute, a public employee is not liable for an injury
resulting from his act or omission where the act or omission was the result of
the exercise
of the discretion vested in him, whether or not such discretion be
' 14 7
abused."
Courts must use caution when determining whether discretionary act
immunity should be conferred on a government employee's acts: the word
"discretionary" does not have a literal interpretation. 148 In the landmark case
construing when an act is discretionary, Johnson v. State of California,149 the
California Supreme Court held that the mere existence of a discretionary choice
in the act performed does not automatically confer immunity.1 50 Rather, only
planning-level activities, which require the governmental employee to make
decision did not impose mandatory duty as to what ultimate placement must be made);
Brenneman v. State, 256 Cal. Rptr. 363, 366 (Ct. App. 1989) (distinguishing mandatory duty
to assess parolee's risk from any specific requirement to take action); Gray v. State, 254 Cal.
Rptr. 581, 583 (Ct. App. 1989) (finding that a statute requiring the California Department of
Justice to notify a gun dealer of purchaser eligibility to possess weapon if purchaser fits into
a particular category did not impose a duty to conduct investigation); Rose v. County of
Plumas, 199 Cal. Rptr. 842, 847 (Ct. App. 1984) (concluding that a statutory duty to train
police officers in first aid did not create a mandatory duty to render aid).
144CAL. GOV'T CODE § 815.2(a) (West 1995); see also Brenneman, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 367.
1451Id. §§ 815.2(b), 820.2.
1461Id. § 820.2.
147Id. Many acts or omissions that are accorded immunity under section 820.2 as
discretionary acts are also immunized under other specific statutory provisions. See, e.g., id.
§§ 818.4, 821.2 (immunizing the issuance, denial, and revocation of permits, certificates, and
licenses); see also Morris, 559 P.2d at 614 n.7 (noting that "many of the individual immunity
provisions ... simply represent specific applications of the general 'discretionary' immunity
principle").
148 Caldwell v. Montoya, 897 P.2d 1320, 1325 (Cal. 1995) ("Almost all acts involve some
choice among alternatives, and the statutory immunity thus cannot depend upon a literal or
semantic parsing of the word 'discretion."'); see, e.g., Sanborn v. Chronicle Pub. Co., 556
P.2d 764, 769 (Cal. 1976) (concluding that although the decision to discuss a matter with the
press may have been within clerk's discretion, as that term is used in common parlance, it
was not "in the nature of a 'basic policy decision' made at the 'planning' stage of City's
operations" but rather fell within the category of routine duties incident to the normal
operations of the office of the clerk).
149447 P.2d 352 (Cal. 1968).
50
Id.at 363. See generally CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENT TORT LIABILITY PRACTICE § 10.11-16
(Robert Waxman ed., 4th ed. 1999 & Supp. 2003) (describing Johnson holding and
explaining that a semantic or literal approach to "discretion" has been repeatedly rejected by
the California Supreme Court).
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basic policy choices, are entitled to immunity. 151 Operational decisions, which
only implement policy, are not immunized. 152 This distinction is sound,
because virtually all acts by governmental employees involve some degree of
choice. 153 Only when a "basic policy" decision is made does the employee's act
constitute an exercise of "discretion" by a coordinate branch of government
that "remain[s] beyond the range of judicial inquiry."'1 54 The discretionary act
immunity exception to the general rule of liability is thus a narrow one. The
Legislature intended it to be "no greater than is required to give legislative and
executive policymakers sufficient breathing space in which to perform their
' 155
vital policymaking functions."
In determining whether an employee has engaged in a basic policy
decision, the status of the governmental employee, although not determinative,
is relevant. Immunity may be denied to employees who occupy positions "at
the lowest ministerial rung of official action.' ' 156 This is because basic policy
151 Johnson, 447

P.2d at 356-58; see also Barner v. Leeds, 13 P.3d 704, 709 (Cal. 2000)

(noting that immunity is reserved for only "basic policy decisions" which have been
committed to coordinate branches of government); Caldwell, 897 P.2d at 1324-25 (quoting
Johnson and explaining that immunity is reserved for "basic policy decisions"). Notably,
other states also only immunize governmental activity when basic policy decisions are
involved. See, e.g., Commercial Carrier v. Indian River County, 371 So. 2d 1010, 1021-22
(Fla. 1979) (finding that governmental immunity only applies to policy-based decisions and
surveying other states' laws to find general agreement among the states); Bruce A. Peterson
& Mark E. Van Der Weide, Susceptible to FaultyAnalysis: United States v. Gaubert and the
Resurrection of Federal Sovereign Immunity, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447 (1997)
(explaining that state laws in California, Delaware, Hawaii, Indiana, Louisiana, Minnesota,
Montana, New Jersey, Oregon, Utah, and Washington find that discretionary act immunity
applies only when the government shows that its employee actually balanced public policy
concerns in his or her decision); Susan Lynn Abbott, Note, Liability of the State and Its
Employees for the Negligent Investigation of Child Abuse Reports, 10 ALASKA L. REV. 401,
417-18 (1993) (noting that immunity applies only to "basic policy decisions").
152 Johnson, 447 P.2d at 356-58; see also Barner, 13 P.3d at 710 n.2 (affirming the planning
and operational decision distinction); Caldwell, 897 P.2d at 1325 (discussing Johnson's
planning and operational decisions distinction as a workable test for discretionary act
immunity).
153 Johnson, 447 P.2d at 356-58; see also Ham v. County of Los Angeles, 189 P. 462, 468
(Cal. Ct. App. 1920) ("[I]t would be difficult to conceive of any official act, no matter how
directly ministerial, that did not admit of some discretion in the manner of its performance,
even if it involved only the driving of a nail."); CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENT TORT LIABILITY

PRACTICE, supra note 78, § 2.115 ("[T]aken literally, the term 'discretionary' lends itself to
such a wide range of applications that it could conceivably nullify almost all vicarious
liability of public entities under the Tort Claims Act for employee torts-a result clearly
inconsistent with legislative intent.").
154 Johnson, 447 P.2d at 360 (quoting 3 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

TREATISE § 25.11 (1958)); see also Barner, 13 P.3d at 710 n.2; cf United States v. Gaubert,
499 U.S. 315, 325 (1991) ("A discretionary act is one that involves choice or judgment ....
conduct is not confined to the policy or planning level.").
Discretionary
155 Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Calif, 551 P.2d 334, 350 (Cal. 1976) (citing Johnson,
447 P.2d at 360); see also Barner, 13 P.3d at 709. See generally supra Part II.B. 1.
156 Johnson, 447 P.2d at 362. But cf Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 33 (1953)
(conferring immunity to "all [federal] employees exercising discretion," regardless of status).
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decisions are normally only made by relatively high-ranking public
employees. 157 Relatedly, courts have "no duty to abstain from reviewing the
choices of a government employee without authorization or special expertise
for making policy decisions."'158 Discretionary act immunity "is an
acknowledgement that courts lack the political authority and expertise to
evaluate decisions based on policy variables."' 159 Therefore, as Justice Scalia
has observed, immunity should be reserved for policy decisions where agency
expertise is utilized, by "an officer whose official responsibilities
include
60
assessment of [social, economic, or political policy] considerations."'
Even if an act by an employee is classified as discretionary, a government
may still be held derivatively liable if the injury resulted "not from the
employee's exercise of 'discretion vested in him' to undertake the act, but from
his negligence in performing it after having made the discretionary decision to
do so."'1 61 Courts have recognized that "although a basic policy decision may be
discretionary and thus warrant governmental immunity, subsequent operational
actions in the implementation of that decision still must face case-by-case

adjudication on the question of negligence.

'1 62

Accordingly,
a public entity
63

may be liable for the "ministerial" acts of its employees. 1
The distinction between policy and operational or ministerial decisions, for

purposes of determining whether governmental immunity exists, is firmly

157 CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENT TORT LIABILITY PRACTICE, supra

note 78, § 2.118; see also
Evan J. Mandery, Qualified Immunity or Absolute Impunity? The Moral Hazards of
Extending Qualified Immunity to Lower-Level Public Officials, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
479 (1994) (criticizing the apparent application, in federal law, of qualified immunity to lowlevel officials); Mark M. Myers, A Unified Approach to State & Municipal Tort Liability in
Washington, 59 WASH. L. REv. 533, 536 (1984) (arguing that immunity should only attach to
high-level governmental actors that create public policy).
158Peterson & Van Der Weide, supra note 151, at 491.
159 id.
160
United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 335 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
161McCorkle v. Los Angeles, 449 P.2d 453, 460 (Cal. 1969) (en banc) (citing Johnson, 447
P.2d at 356); see also Lopez v. S. Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 710 P.2d 907, 915 (Cal. 1985)
(finding that "subsequent ministerial actions taken in the implementation of' discretionary
policy decisions are not immunized); Newton v. County of Napa, 266 Cal. Rptr. 682, 687-88
(Ct. App. 1990) (finding that a welfare department official's decision to conduct an
investigation of child abuse is immune from liability, but that this does not preclude liability
for actions implied in the decision to investigate); Sava v. Fuller, 57 Cal. Rptr. 312, 317 (Ct.
App. 1967) ("[O]nce the determination has been made that a service will be furnished and
the service is undertaken, then public policy demands (except when the Legislature
specifically decrees otherwise) that the government be held to the same standard of care as
the
law requires of its private citizens ....
").
162
Bamer v. Leeds, 13 P.3d 704, 711 (Cal. 2000).
161
McCorkle, 449 P.2d at 459; see also Barner, 13 P.3d
at 709 ("[T]here is no basis for
immunizing lower level decisions that merely implement a basic policy already
formulated."); Ramos v. County of Madera, 484 P.2d 93, 98-99 (Cal. 1971) (en banc)
(explaining that actors making low level ministerial decisions are not protected by
immunity).
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entrenched in California jurisprudence. To be sure, commentators have
criticized this distinction, claiming that it unduly limits the scope of
immunity. 164 Some have even urged the California Supreme Court to overrule
Johnson and adopt a literal definition of "discretionary." 165 Applying such a
literal approach might be more consistent with Federal Tort Claims Act cases
that grant broader immunity, including immunity for operational decisions
involving the exercise of judgment. 166 But the California Supreme Court has
167
repeatedly rejected these urgings and has refused to overturn Johnson:
Even if we were inclined to disagree with the principles set forth in Johnson,
we do not believe it would be appropriate to overrule or disapprove more than
three decades of precedent applying authoritative settled statutory construction
that has been central to the analysis and holdings of these decisions... The
principles underlying the doctrine of stare decisis apply with special force in
the context of statutory interpretation,
because the Legislature remains free to
68
alter what we have done.1

164 Barner, 13 P.3d at 710 n.2. Some commentators suggest that Johnson may be inconsistent

with the intent of the Tort Claims Act. The merits of this argument are debatable, but
whether Johnson is, in fact, inconsistent with the Act is a moot issue. The legislature's
inaction over thirty years indicates it has acquiesced in the Johnson interpretation. Id.; see,
e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 601 (1983) ("In view of its prolonged
and acute awareness of so important an issue, Congress' failure to act on the bills proposed
on this subject provides added support for concluding that Congress acquiesced in the IRS
rulings."); People v. Meloney, 70 P.3d 1023, 1034 (Cal. 2003) (noting that when a "statute
has been construed by judicial decision, and that construction is not altered by subsequent
legislation, it must be presumed that the Legislature is aware of the judicial construction and
approves of it") (citations omitted). The continuing legislative acquiescence to Johnson

"bespeaks ratification more than rejection."

CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENT TORT LIABILITY

supra note 78, § 2.117.
1 Barner, 13 P.3d at 710 n.2.
166
Id.; see also United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 325 (1991) ("A discretionary act is
one that involves choice or judgment; there is nothing in that description that refers
exclusively to policymaking or planning functions."); cf Berkovitz v. United States, 486
U.S. 531, 536-37 (1988) (noting immunity attaches to governmental "actions or decisions
based on considerations of public policy"). Even federal law, however, immunizes only
discretionary decisions that have some relationship to public policy. See, e.g., Coulthurst v.
United States, 214 F.3d 106, 108-09 (2d Cir. 2000) (explaining that Berkovitz and Gaubert
immunize only discretionary decisions that are "grounded in considerations of public policy"
or susceptible to policy analysis); Franklin Sav. Corp. v. United States, 180 F.3d 1124, 1130,
1135-36 (10th Cir. 1999) (describing subsequent interpretations of Berkovitz which lighten
the government's burden regarding when an official exercise of discretion is susceptible to
policy analysis).
167 See, e.g., Creason v. State Dep't of Health Servs., 957 P.2d 1323, 1329-30 (Cal. 1998)
(applying Johnson's distinction between operational and planning decisions); Lopez v. S.
Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 710 P.2d 907, 915 (Cal. 1985) (applying Johnson's distinction
between operational and planning decisions, and indicating that immunity is conferred only
for "basic policy decisions"); see also Nunn v. State, 677 P.2d 846, 849-50 (Cal. 1984) (en
banc); Sanborn v. Chronicle Publ'g Co., 556 P.2d 764, 768-69 (Cal. 1976); Tarasoff v.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 349-50 (Cal. 1976); Ramos v. County of Madera,
484
P.2d 93, 98-99 (Cal. 1971).
68
1 Barner, 13 P.3d at 710 n.2 (citing Hunt v. Superior Court, 987 P.2d 705, 720 (Cal. 1999)).
PRACTICE,
65
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Consequently, lower courts may not "casually decree governmental
' 69 They may reach that result only
immunity" under the rubric of "discretion."
was a
when the governmental entity has made a "strong showing" that its act
basic policy decision.170 Immunity remains the exception; liability the rule. "'
III. THE CURRENT STATUS OF GOVERNMENTAL LIABILITY IN FOSTER CARE
ABUSE CASES

Although, at one time, a county and its workers could be sued for negligent
supervision or placement of a child in foster care, the courts have recently
attempted to change the law. California appellate courts, in the last few years,
have interpreted the foster care placement statutes so narrowly that direct
liability will rarely, if ever, be found. Likewise, derivative liability - once the
clearest path to governmental liability - is also now almost impossible to
establish. The courts have improperly ignored the policy rationales and legal
principles underlying the California Tort Claims Act to grant counties and their
172
Whether by design or not, these rulings
social workers absolute immunity.
173
that the legislature intended to be
injuries
for
rob foster children of a remedy
redressed.
A. Traditional Understandingsof Liability In Foster Care Placement and
Supervision

In the years immediately following the enactment of the California Tort
Claims Act, governmental liability for negligent foster care placement and
supervision was the rule, not the exception. Social workers were not entitled to
immunity, because their decisions regarding the maintenance, care, and
supervision of dependent children did not constitute basic policy decisions. In
169 Johnson, 447

P.2d at 363.

170 Id

171Ramos, 484 P.2d at 98 (citing the "well-settled notion that in governmental tort cases, 'the
rule is liability, immunity is the exception' and stating that "[u]nless the legislature has
clearly provided for immunity, the important societal goal of compensating injured parties
for damages caused by willful or negligent acts must prevail"). The California Supreme
Court has never veered from this general rule. See, e.g., Lopez, 710 P.2d at 915 ("[I]n
governmental tort cases, 'the rule is liability, immunity is the exception."'); Milligan v. City
of Laguna Beach, 670 P.2d 1121, 1123 n.2 (Cal. 1983) (stating that the court's " decisions
since the adoption of the Tort Claims Act of 1963 . . . have adhered to this basic axiom of
tort law" that liability is the rule and immunity the exception); see also Baldwin v. State, 491
P.2d 1121, 1128-29 (Cal. 1972); Johnson, 447 P.2d at 363; Muskopf v. Coming Hosp. Dist.,
359 P.2d 457, 462 (Cal. 1961).
172 See, e.g., Los Angeles County v. Superior Ct. (Terrell R.), 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 637, 640-41
(Ct. App. 2002); Becerra v. County of Santa Cruz, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 165, 170-71 (Ct. App.
1998).
173See supra note 19-21 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of the Court of
Appeal cases).
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1968, the California Supreme Court, in Johnson, held that once the basic policy
decision of placing a youth with foster parents has been made,17 4 immunity
ends and subsequent negligent acts are subject to legal redress. 175 In that case,
the state was found liable for failing to warn a foster parent of the homicidal
76
tendencies of the child placed in her home.'
Although the Johnson court did not address the issue directly, the logic of
that decision implied that social workers were not entitled to immunity from
negligent foster care placement and supervision claims. The Johnson court
reaffirmed that the Tort Claims Act did not alter the basic teachings of Muskopf
that a government has a heavy burden and must make a "strong showing" to
overcome the presumption against immunity. 77 In Johnson, the court held that
a parole officer's decision to warn or not to warn foster parents of the child's
178
violent background was "at the lowest ministerial rung of official action,"'
and the negligent failure to warn constituted "a classic case for the imposition
of tort liability."'179 The Court found persuasive that "since the entire populace
of California benefits from the activity of the Youth Authority, it should also
share equally the burden of injuries negligently inflicted on individual
citizens." 0 Suits against the state, the court concluded, "provide a fair and
efficient means to distribute ... losses."' 8 1 No reason existed to believe that
this analysis did not apply with equal force to social workers.
By 1970, the courts had addressed the issue directly. In Elton v. County of
Orange,18 the court of appeal held that social workers were not immune from
negligent supervision claims because foster child supervision decisions do not
involve making basic policy choices, and therefore are not discretionary acts
within the meaning of the statute:
Decisions made with respect to the maintenance, care or supervision of . a
dependent child, or in connection with her placement in a particular home,
may entail the exercise of discretion in a literal sense, but such determinations
174 Johnson, 447 P.2d at 363-64. Subsequent cases have held that the decision to initiate

dependency proceedings and remove a child from parental custody is a basic policy decision
that confers immunity. Alicia T. v. County of Los Angeles, 271 Cal. Rptr. 513, 519-20 (Ct.
App. 1990); Jenkins v. County of Orange, 260 Cal. Rptr. 645, 647-48 (Ct. App. 1989).
175 Johnson, 447 P.2d at 364 (explaining that "[o]nce the proper authorities have made the
basic policy decision-to place a youth with foster parents, for example-the role of section
845.8 immunity ends; subsequent negligent acts, such as the failure to give reasonable
warnings
to the foster parents actually selected, are subject to legal redress").
176
Id. The California Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion in a related context three
years later. Ramos v. County of Madera, 484 P.2d 93, 100 (Cal. 1971) ("The authority given
counties to implement the basic policy decisions of the legislature as here (and where
delegated to the Department of Social Welfare) is purely ministerial.").
177 Johnson, 447 P.2d at 363.
178 Id. at 362.

'79 1d. at 363.
180Id.
18 11d.
182 84 Cal. Rptr. 27 (Ct. App. 1970).
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do not achieve the level of basic policy decisions, and thus do not, under the
provisions of Government Code section 820.2, preclude judicial inquiry into
whether negligence of public employees was involved
83 and whether such
negligence caused or contributed to plaintiff s injuries.1
In that case, the foster parents allegedly "struck, battered, bruised, scalded,

beat[] and physically and mentally forced [the plaintiff] to submit to physical
and mental atrocities."' 184 The county's alleged negligence was its improper
certification of the foster home and its negligent placement of the plaintiff in
that home. 185 The Elton court held that the initial decision to classify the child
as a dependent child and to remove her from her parental home was a basic

policy decision to which immunity would attach. 186 But the actual placement of
the child in a foster home, the certification, and the administration of the child's

care were not planning or policy decisions, and were therefore left unprotected
by statutory immunity.

87

The court also found that the foster care statutes

88
imposed mandatory duties.'

The Elton decision and the analytical framework established in Johnson

were followed throughout the 1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s. Case after case
cited Elton approvingly, both in and out of the foster care context.", Courts
concluded that absolute immunity was not available to social workers. 190
183
id.
184 1d. at 29.
185

Id.

186
1d. at
187
Id.
188

30-31.

Id. at 31-32; see also Wood v. County of San Joaquin, 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d 340, 352
(Ct. App.
2003) (citing Elton as an example of how mandatory duties are imposed when a county fails
to comply with its own "mandatory state standards of foster home inspection and
supervision").
189
See, e.g., Scott v. County of Los Angeles, 32 Cal. Rptr.
2d 643, 651 (Ct. App. 1994)
(citing Elton and noting that there is no immunity for social workers who are "negligen[t]...
in the supervision of a minor in foster care"); see also Morris v. County of Marin, 559 P.2d
606, 615 (Cal. 1977) (citing Elton); Ramos v. County of Madera, 484 P.2d 93, 99 (Cal.
1971) (citing and approving of Elton); Wood, 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d 340, 352 (Ct. App. 2003)
(citing Elton); Walt Rankin & Assocs., Inc. v. City of Murrieta, 101 Cal. Rptr. 2d 48, 66 (Ct.
App. 2000) (citing Elton); MacDonald v. State, 281 Cal. Rptr. 317, 333 (Ct. App. 1991)
(citing Elton); Shelton v. City of Westminster, 188 Cal. Rptr. 205, 210 (Ct. App. 1982)
(citing Elton). But see Smith v. Alameda County Soc. Servs. Agency, 153 Cal. Rptr. 712,
718 (Ct. App. 1979) (distinguishing foster care from other governmental tort claims because
the foster care placement statutes were designed to protect the health and safety of dependent
children, unlike other statutes).
190 MacDonald,281 Cal. Rptr. at 326 (noting that foster care placement is unique in the kind
and degree of a state and county's inspection duties); Smith, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 718
(explaining that foster care placement and supervision is unique). Social workers do,
however, enjoy absolute immunity in their decision to investigate child abuse reports and
initiate dependency proceedings, but only because of the prosecutorial nature of that
decision. See Alicia T.v.County of Los Angeles, 271 Cal. Rptr. 513, 519 (Ct. App. 1990)
(discussing prosecutorial immunity); Jenkins v. County of Orange, 260 Cal. Rptr. 645, 64748 (Ct. App. 1989) (discussing prosecutorial immunity); cf Scott, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 653
(immunity does not extend to negligence in performance of other social workers' functions
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Supervision of defenseless children, once committed to the custody of the state,
is a ministerial or operational act that must be accomplished with reasonable
care. In 1984, the California Supreme Court sitting en banc, cited Elton with
approval, characterizing the supervision of children in foster homes as
involving ministerial, operational, or "street level" decisions. 191 As such, social
workers could not enjoy discretionary immunity for negligently placing or
supervising foster children. 192 Even as recently as 1994, the court of appeal in
Scott v. County of Los Angeles held that although social workers may be
immunized from liability for their decision to initiate dependency proceedings,
93
"the same immunity does not extend to other functions of194social workers."'1
Foster child supervision consists of only "ministerial" acts.
The Elton holding-that social workers can be sued for negligent foster
child placement and supervision-was not only the law in California, it was the
law throughout most of the country. 195 As a New York court observed: "The
of supervising children who are subject of dependency proceedings).

191Nunn v. State, 677 P.2d 846, 849-50 (Cal. 1984) (en banc) (characterizing ~probation

department's negligent placement of dependent child in foster home where she suffered
mistreatment and failure to perform state-mandated inspection" as a nondiscretionary
operational act); see also Morris, 559 P.2d at 615 (citing with approval Elton and noting that
liability attached because the county failed "to comply with mandatory standards of
inspection and supervision dictated by state regulations").
92
Nunn, 677 P.2d at 850.
'9 Scott, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 652 n.12.
194/d. at 653-54 (noting that there is "no policy reason" to confer immunity to "the separate

and distinct functions of supervising the foster care of children who are the subject of
dependency proceedings"); cf Jordy v. Humboldt, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 553, 559-60 (Ct. App.
1992) (explaining that "a public entity has a duty to prevent physical abuse of children in the
custody of the state where it has notice of the abuse," but holding that there is no state duty
to provide nonnegligent care for children in foster care, and that therefore a government is
not liable merely when the foster parents are negligent).
195 See, e.g., Doe v. Jefferson County, 985 F. Supp. 66, 71 (N.D.N.Y. 1997)
(noting that
under New York law, the government may be liable for a social worker's negligent
supervision, and social workers are not entitled to qualified immunity); Vonner v. State, 273
So.2d 252, 255-57 (La. 1972) (finding governmental liability for negligent foster care
supervision); Koepf v. County of York, 251 N.W.2d 866, 870-71 (Neb. 1977) (citing Elton
with approval and holding that there is no discretionary act immunity for social workers);
Barnes v. Nassau County, 487 N.Y.S.2d 827, 830-31 (App. Div. 1985) (citing and approving
of Elton); Bartels v. County of Westchester, 429 N.Y.S.2d 906, 909-10 (App. Div. 1980)
(following Elton); Brown Eyes v. South Dakota Dep't of Soc. Servs., 630 N.W.2d 501, 50607 (S.D. 2001) (holding that the "placement and follow-up of children in foster care by
social workers is a ministerial function," despite the fact that there may be some discretion
involved in a literal sense because social workers are not making policy decisions); Nat'l
Bank of South Dakota v. Leir, 325 N.W.2d 845, 849-50 (S.D. 1982) (citing Elton and
finding no discretionary act immunity for negligent supervision claims against social
workers because the criteria for placement and standards for follow-up of foster children are
already established); Little v. Utah State Div. of Family Servs., 667 P.2d 49, 50-52 (Utah
1983) (following Elton reasoning); Babcock v. State, 809 P.2d 143 (Wash. 1991) (following
Elton reasoning); cf Edwards v. Dep't of Children & Youth Servs., 525 S.E.2d 83, 84-86
(Ga. 2000) (finding that provision of medical care for a child in a youth detention center is
nondiscretionary because it does not involve a policy judgment). But see Pickett v.
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overriding weight of appellate authority in this country is in agreement that a
State ...may be answerable for injuries suffered by children as a result of
96
negligence in the placement or supervision of children in their charge."' As in
Elton, other state courts concluded that foster child supervision does not
197
Immunity is
involve basic policy decisions, but only ministerial acts.
therefore not available.
In the mid-1990s, however, California appellate courts began to chip away
at what had once been bedrock law. Signs of this change became apparent
when the Fourth District Court of Appeal criticized its own earlier decision. In
Ronald S. v. County of San Diego, the court described Elton as a "difficult

decision" because it believed foster care placement to be an activity "loaded
with subjective determinations."'1 98 Nevertheless, the court was careful to note
that foster care supervision was unique: "[t]he maintenance of a child in a
foster home involves an obligation of continued supervision by the County ....
Much of what the County is obligated to do in terms of continued
administration of the child's welfare undoubtedly constitutes simple and
uncomplicated surveillance which reasonably could be characterized as
ministerial."' 99 And despite its criticism of Elton, the court emphasized
200 that it
did not intend to "disapprov[e] or retreat from [its] decision in Elton."
By the late 1990s, what started as a criticism had turned into attempts to
constrain Elton's holding, and then to reject it outright. In 1999, in Becerra v.
County of Santa Cruz, the court of appeal ostensibly held that although there
may be liability for failure to follow specific statutorily mandated procedures,
immunity would be the rule, not the exception. 201 Becerra correctly addressed
the direct liability analysis to find that the placement statutes required
assessment of certain mandatory criteria.202 But Becerra then erred when it
turned to the issue of derivative liability. Abandoning the holding of Elton, and
implicitly ignoring the instructions of Nunn and Johnson, the Court ruled that a
social worker's placement of a foster child was entitled to immunity. 20 3 Relying
on Ronald S. - but ignoring its explicit admonitions - the Court reasoned that

Washington County, 572 P.2d 1070 (Or. 1977). For a general discussion of governmental
tort liability for a social service agency's negligence in the supervision of foster children, see
Carolyn A. Kubitschek, Annotation, Social Worker Malpractice for Failure to Protect
Foster Children, 41 AM. JUR. TRIALS 1, § 26 (2003); Sonja A. Soehnel, Annotation,
Governmental Tort Liability for Social Service Agency's Negligence in Placement, or
SupervisionAfter Placement,of Children, 90 A.L.R. 3D 1214 (1979).
196Barnes, 487 N.Y.S.2d at 830.
97
1 See supra note 195.
' 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 418, 424-25 (Ct. App. 1993).
'9 9 Id.at 425.
200
id.

20o81

Cal. Rptr. 2d 165, 170-74 (Ct. App. 1998).

02Id.at 170 (finding that the mandatory duty "imposed upon the County by section 16501.1,

subdivision (c) ...is to evaluate the stated criteria prior to making a placement selection").
203 Id. at 172-74.
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because social workers exercise discretion in making placement decisions, the
government is shielded from liability:
Selecting and certifying a foster [family] home for care of dependent children
seems to us to be an activity loaded with subjective determinations and fraught
with major possibilities of an erroneous decision. It appears to us that foster
[family] home placement ... constitutes an activity of a co-equal branch of
government, and that the discretionary decisions made in connection
therewith
2 4
should be deemed beyond the proper scope of court review.
In short, the Becerra court improperly applied the prohibited literal definition
of "discretionary" and found that because "social workers engage in a
discretionary
analysis of the needs and interests of a dependent child, immunity
20 5
exists.'
Then, in 2002, the court of appeal completely rejected the holdings of
Elton. The court of appeal multiplied the mistakes of Becerra to not only
reaffirm Becerra's faulty derivative liability analysis - de facto immunizing
counties from all derivative liability - but also to eliminate any direct liability
exposure. By doing so, the appeals court turned thirty years of precedent on its
head.
B. The IllegitimateMove To Absolute Governmental Immunity
In September 2002, the Second District Court of Appeal decided County of
Los Angeles v. Superior Court (In re Terrell R.). 206 That case, in dramatic
terms, reimposed absolute governmental immunity in the context of derivative
claims for negligent foster child placement and supervision. Moreover, its
holding, if followed by other courts, would render most direct liability claims
unviable.
The facts of the Terrell R. case are not unusual for a foster care abuse case.
In 1999, the County Department of Children and Family Services removed
Terrell, an eleven-year-old, and his siblings, from the custody of their
grandmother. 20 7 The children were removed because the grandmother was
unable to provide for them and was allegedly abusing prescription drugs.20 8 A
state-licensed foster family agency certified a family friend, Robert Poole, as a
foster parent. 2 09 Poole, however, had completed only fifteen of the thirty hours
of training that the agency required for certification.210 Moreover, a "child
abuse index clearance, the results of a TB test, and verification of employment
204Id. at 173 (quoting Ronald S. v. County of San Diego, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 418, 425 (Ct. App.

1993)).

20 5
206

id.
125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 637 (Ct. App. 2002).

207Id. at

208 id.
209

1d"

210ld,

641.
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had not been completed prior to the certification." 2 11 Despite the County social
worker's awareness that Poole had not completed the requirements for
certification, and that Terrell would not be with his siblings or other relatives,
212
Terrell was placed in Poole's home.
213
Poole's home was not an appropriate placement..
Although Terrell had
his own bedroom, he slept in the same bed as Poole.2 14 Poole allegedly
repeatedly sexually molested and abused Terrell over several months. 21 5 The
County social worker was unaware of what was happening because she did not
216
visit Terrell at Poole's home during his placement.
Terrell sued the County and others, asserting causes of action under the
Tort Claims Act.2 17 Terrell alleged that his placement in the Poole home
violated several mandatory duties. 21 8 The alleged mandatory duty violations,
included, among other things: (1) placing Terrell in an uncertified home; (2)
failing to monitor Terrell's condition and visit him regularly at his home; and
(3) failing to place Terrell with relatives and his siblings. 219 He also alleged that
his supervision after placement was negligent.220 The county moved for
summary judgment.22 1 It argued that it was immune from suit for two reasons.
The county claimed it breached no mandatory duties that proximately caused
any injury to Terrell.222 The county also urged that any negligence was the
result of the social worker's exercise of discretion, and therefore the County
was also immune on any derivative liability claim. 3 The trial court denied the
County's summary judgment motion and a writ of mandate was filed.224
In writ proceedings, the Court of Appeal ordered the trial court to grant
summary judgment in the County's favor. 25 The Court of Appeal granted the
writ on two grounds. The court first found there could be no direct liability.
According to the court, "foster care placement [and supervision] is a
governmental function that involves the exercise of discretion" and the
obligatory language of the foster care statutes are "merely [statements of] a
211id.

212Id.
213

1d. at 642.

214id.
215id.

216id.
217

Id. Terrell initially sued Robert Poole, Monica Poole, the County, Wings of Refuge, and
Dependency Court Legal Services. The Terrell R. decision focused only on the issue of
whether the County could be held liable.
211Id. at 642, 645.
219
Id. at 645-48.
22 d. at 649.
221d. at 642-43.
222 Id. at 642.
223
Id. at 643.
224 Id.
225

Id. at 650.
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legislative goal or policy. 226 More controversially, the court concluded that the
purpose of the statutes and regulations regarding foster care placement is not to
prevent sexual abuse. 227 Instead, the court found that the statutes' purpose is to
encourage family reunification. 228 Therefore, no mandatory duties were
imposed by the foster care placement statutes, and the County was not directly
liable as a matter of law. 229 Second, the court held that the County could not be
derivatively liable.230 The court ruled that discretionary act immunity applied
because social workers had choices on how to supervise and place children.23 1
The court agreed that "selecting and certifying a foster [family] home for care
of dependent children [is] ...an activity loaded with subjective determinations
...and that the discretionary decisions made in connection therewith should be
deemed beyond the proper scope of court review., 232 On December 18, 2002,
the California Supreme Court denied review and denied a request for
depublication.233
C. JudicialMissteps: Why Los Angeles County v. Superior Court (Terrell R.)
Got It Wrong
The Court of Appeal's broad pronouncements in Terrell R. were
misguided, and the legal reasoning used to make those pronouncements was
fundamentally unprincipled. First, the court's direct liability analysis was
fraught with errors. It initially erred by ruling that the statutory provisions
governing foster care placement impose no mandatory duties.234 The court
compounded that error by holding that the purpose of the child welfare statutes
is not to protect children from abuse.235 The court reached these conclusionsrepresenting a significant departure from prior precedent-even though the
text, the legislative history, and the government's own interpretation of the
statutory provisions governing foster care placement all support the opposite
conclusion. Second, the court erred in its derivative liability analysis. By
ignoring binding Supreme Court precedent, the court reached the unfounded
conclusion that a social worker is entitled to discretionary act 236
immunity even
for negligently making operational, non-policy based decisions.
226

Id. at 645-48.

227
Id.
228
1d.

648-50.
id.
231Id. at 644-46.
232Id. at 649 (quoting Becerra v. County of Santa Cruz, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 165, 172-74 (Ct.
221Id. at
230

App. 1998)).
233A rehearing was denied on October 18, 2002. Review and a request for depublication was
denied on December 18, 2002.
234 Terrell R., 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 645-48.
235
Id.
236

Although this Article criticizes the Court of Appeal's analysis and interpretation of the
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The statutes governingfoster careplacement impose mandatory
duties.

The court's holding that the statutory provisions governing foster care
237
ignores
placement do not impose mandatory duties as a matter of law
to the
first
turn
must
A
court
construction.
established principles of statutory
2 38
If the
language of the statute and give the words their ordinary meaning.
words of the statute are unambiguous, courts are compelled to apply their plain
meaning, 239 unless doing so would result in an absurdity 240 or frustrate the
statute's manifest purpose. 241 If the court finds the statutory language
ambiguous, it should then turn to extrinsic evidence, such as legislative history,
to determine legislative intent. 242 The Terrell R. court engaged in none of this
analysis.
The conclusion that the child welfare statutes only set legislative goals and
policies, and do not impose mandatory duties, is inconsistent with the statutory
text. The child welfare statutes at issue in Terrell R. use mandatory, not

Tort Claims Act, the Article does not intend to comment on the ultimate outcome based on
the facts of that case. It may well be that even if the court had correctly applied the Tort
Claims Act, no liability would have been found if the case had gone to trial. From the court's
description of what happened, it is unclear that the social worker's negligence caused
Terrell's injuries or that sufficient warning signs existed such that a reasonable social worker
would have been on notice that the Poole home was an inappropriate placement.
237 TerrellR., 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 640-42.
238 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1858 (West Supp. 2004) ("[I]n the construction of a statute ...

the Judge is simply to ascertain and declare what is in terms or in substance contained
therein .... "); People v. Rubalcava, 1 P.3d 52, 56 (Cal. 2000); see also People v. Birkett,
980 P.2d 912, 915 (Cal. 1999) ("[W]e turn first to the language of the statute, giving the
words their ordinary meaning.").
239 Lungren v. Deukmejian, 755 P.2d 299, 303-04 (Cal. 1988) (explaining
that when
statutory language is unambiguous, a court need not rely on other indicia of legislative
intent); In re Lance W., 694 P.2d 744, 752 (Cal. 1985) (explaining that a court may not go
beyond plain unambiguous language of statute); J.A. Jones Constr. Co. v. Superior Court, 33
Cal. Rptr. 2d 206, 210 (Ct. App. 1984) (explaining that where the text of a statute is clear, a
court should not inquire into legislative intent).
240 People v. Jenkins, 893 P.2d 1224, 1231 (Cal. 1995); People v.
Broussard, 856 P.2d 1134,
1136 (Cal. 1993) (quoting Younger v. Superior Court, 577 P.2d 1014 (Cal. 1978)).
241 See generally Russell Holder, Comment, Say What You Mean and Mean What You Say:
The Resurrectionof PlainMeaning in California Courts, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 569, 572-74
(1997).
242 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1859 (West 1983) (requiring that
courts pursue the intent of the
legislature when construing a statute); see also People v. Woodhead, 741 P.2d 154, 156 (Cal.
1987) (finding that if the language permits more than one reasonable interpretation, then the
court must look "to a variety of extrinsic aids, including the ostensible objects to be
achieved, the evils to be remedied, the legislative history, public policy, contemporaneous
administrative construction, and the statutory scheme of which the statute is a part"); Nunn
v. State, 677 P.2d 846, 851 (Cal. 1984) (en banc) ("[Wlhen the specific language does not
shed light as to the intent of the legislature, it can be determined from other factors.")
Friends of Mammoth v. Bd. of Supervisors, 502 P.2d 1049, 1056 (Cal. 1972) (finding that
courts may use "extrinsic aids" besides legislators' statements to determine intent).
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discretionary, language. 2 3 The word "shall" appears repeatedly in the
statutes.244 The plain language of the statutes at issue in Terrell R. makes clear
that the social workers have mandatory duties including:
"

placing the dependent child, if possible and safe
to do so, in
245
the home of a relative rather than a foster home;

*

taking diligent steps to locate an appropriate relative, 246 and
evaluating all relatives for their al7ropriateness, before
placing a child in long-term foster care;

*

providin44 family

*

selecting foster homes, based on whether the home is safe,
most family-like, and in close proximity to the child's
biological parent's home rather than selecting homes based
on other considerations;24

children;

reunification

services

for

all

foster

243See supra note 140.
244 See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 7950(a)(1)

(West Supp. 2004) (requiring that certain

considerations "shall be used," that "[p]lacement shall, if possible, be made in the home of a
relative," that "diligent efforts shall be made to locate an appropriate relative," and that
"[b]efore any child may be placed in long-term foster care, [relatives] shall be evaluated as
an appropriate placement resource") (emphasis added); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 16000

("Family reunification services shall be provided ... as required by law) (emphasis added);
Id. § 16501.1(c) ("[T]he decision regarding choice of placement shall be based upon
selection of a safe setting

.

") (emphasis added); CAL. DEP'T OF SOC. SERVS., DSS

reg. 31-420.2 (1992) [hereinafter DSS MANUAL]
(requiring a social worker to adhere to certain priorities in foster care placement).
245CAL. FAM. CODE § 7950(a)(1) ("Placement shall, if possible, be made in the home of a
relative, unless the placement would not be in the best interest of the child.") (emphasis
added).
246 Id. ("Diligent efforts shall be made
to locate an appropriate relative.") (emphasis
added).
247
Id.("Before any child may be placed in long-term foster care, the court shall find that the
agency or entity to which this subdivision applies has made diligent efforts to locate an
appropriate relative and that each relative whose name has been submitted to the agency or
entity as a possible caretaker, either by himself or herself or by other persons, has been
evaluated as an appropriate placement resource.").
MANUAL OF POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

248 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 16000 ("Family reunification services shall be provided for

expeditious reunification of the child with his or her family, as required by law.") (emphasis
added).
249
Id.§ 16501.1 (c) ("If out-of-home placement is used to attain case plan goals, the decision
regarding choice of placement shall be based upon selection of a safe setting that is the least
restrictive or most familylike [sic] and the most appropriate setting that is available and in
close proximity to the parent's home, consistent with the selection of the environment best
suited to meet the child's special needs and best interest, or both. The section shall consider,
in order of priority, placement with relatives, tribal members, and foster family, group care,
and residential treatment pursuant to Section 7950 of the Family Code.") (emphasis added);
see also DSS MANUAL, supra note 244, reg. 31-420.2 (1992) (requiring a priority of
relatives, foster family, and licensed group home).
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*
*

placing dependent children only in certified family homes,
25
and
when a foster home placement is necessary;
251
but at least three times in
visiting the foster child monthly, 252
the first thirty days after placement.

Supporting the conclusion that mandatory duties exist in the child welfare
statutes is evidence of what the Legislature did not do. If the Legislature had
intended to exclude the child welfare statutes from the purview of the Tort
Claims Act, it would have said so expressly. 253 When the legislature has
254
intended the word "shall" not to create a mandatory duty, it has been explicit.
If the obligatory, statutory language-the most important guide in
determining legislative intent255-was not dispositive, as the court apparently
believed, the court was required "to point to other factors [to] indicate that [the]
apparent obligatory language was not intended to foreclose" an exercise of
discretion. 256 But the court provided no reason why the plain obligatory
language did not mean what it said. 257 Nor did it cite, or could it cite, to any
authority or legislative history to support its contrary interpretation. 58 It could
259
not do so, because the authority uniformly contradicts the court's holding.
Every decision prior to Terrell R. agreed that the child welfare statutes impose
some mandatory duties, at least to evaluate certain criteria in making placement
250 DSS MANUAL, supra note 244, reg. 31-420.22 (permitting placement in a "licensed foster
family home, licensed small family home, or a licensed foster family agency for placement
in a family home which has been certified by thefosterfamily agency") (emphasis added).
251CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 16516.5(a) (requiring that foster children
placed in group

homes "shall be visited at least monthly by a county social worker or probation officer" and
that "[e]ach visit shall include a private discussion between the foster child and the county
social worker or probation officer"); DSS MANUAL, supra note 244, reg. 31-320.41.
252 DSS MANUAL, supra note 244, reg. 31-320.2.
253 See supra note 140 (explaining that mandatory duties exist only
when the Legislature uses
mandatory language).
254 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.99(d) (noting that "[n]othing
in this section shall be
construed to alter immunity of employee of the Department of Housing and Community
Development under the Tort Claims Act"); CAL. PENAL CODE § 12076(k) (deeming the
Department of Justice's acts, as they pertain to firearms, to be discretionary within the
meaning of the Tort Claims Act); Id. § 12084(e) (deeming action under this section "to be a
discretionary
act under the meaning of the California Tort Claims Act").
255
Morris v. County of Marin, 559 P.2d 606, 612 n.6 (Cal. 1977); see also Haggis v. City of
Los Angeles, 993 P.2d 983, 987 (Cal. 2000) (quoting Morris and noting that statutory
language is a most important guide to determining legislative intent); In re Sergio R., 131
Cal. Rptr. 2d 160, 164 (Ct. App. 2003) (quoting Haggis).
216Morris, 559 P.2d at 612 n.6; see also supra notes 140-143 and accompanying text.
211 Terrell R., 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 640-48.
258
1d.
259See generally Morris, 559 P.2d at 612 n.6 (finding the use of the word "shall" to be clear
statutory language and that therefore there could be no question that the provision imposed a
mandatory duty); Elson v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 124 Cal. Rptr. 305, 307-08 (Ct. App. 1975)
(finding that a mandatory duty was clearly involved when the statute used obligatory
language).
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and supervision choices. 26 Moreover, case law in other contexts, decided under
section 815.6,
has held that comparable statutory language imposed mandatory
26 1
duties.
In fact, even the social service agency's own interpretation of the statutes is
contrary to the court's conclusion. The Department of Health and Human
Services, which periodically reviews the Juvenile Justice System in California,
recognizes that the dependency laws impose mandatory duties on social
workers, such as maintaining a case plan, periodically visiting the foster child,
and holding permanency hearings within set time periods.262 Moreover,
common sense favors finding that the statutes impose mandatory duties. If the
criteria and other requirements set forth in the foster care placement statutes
may be simply disregarded, what was the purpose of their enumeration by the
legislature? The California Legislature agrees. In response to the Terrell R.
decision, the Legislature amended the Welfare and Institutions Code to reaffirm
that the state has a "duty to comply" with the federal law requirements (such as
maintaining case plans, holding periodic reviews and timely permanency
hearings) relevant to the protection and welfare of foster care children.263
The court attempted to justify ignoring the statutory language, prior
precedent, and the agency's interpretation of its own regulations, by stating that
because "foster care placement is a governmental function that involves the
exercise of discretion," mandatory duties could not exist. 26 4 But this is no
justification at all. That a statute imposes discretion in one area (in this case, the
policy decision that an abused child should be removed from parental custody
and placed in foster care), does not mean that the statute does not impose
mandatory requirements on how that discretion may be used in other areas
260

See, e.g., Becerra v. County of Santa Cruz, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 165, 170 (Ct. App. 1998)

(holding that statutes, such as section 16501.1, created a mandatory duty to "evaluate stated
criteria" in making a placement selection); see also Scott v. County of Los Angeles, 32 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 643, 646 (Ct. App. 1994); Elton v. County of Orange, 84 Cal. Rptr. 27 (Ct. App.
1970). Admittedly, the Terrell R. court paid lip service to Becerra. But after noting that
earlier decisions found that mandatory duties exist, Terrell R. reached the inconsistent result
that section 16501.1, despite the holding in Becerra, created no mandatory duties. TerrellR.,

125 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 646-47.
v. County of Los Angeles, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 651, 653 (Ct. App. 1996)
(finding statutory language stating that when a coroner takes a dead body, the coroner "shall
make a reasonable attempt to locate the family" imposes a mandatory duty to make a
261 Compare Davila

"reasonable attempt") with CAL. FAM. CODE § 7950 (West Supp. 2004) (requiring that
"[d]iligent efforts shall be made to locate an appropriate relative").
262See

2000 AUDIT OF PROTECTIONS, supra note 4, at i ("[C]ertain protections are mandated
for each foster care child under State supervision"); id. at 4 ("The objectives of our audit
were to determine if the: (i) mandatoryfoster care protections consisting of the case plan,
periodic reviews, and permanency hearings were provided .. ")(emphasis added).
263CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 16000.1 ("It is the intent of the Legislature to confirm the

state's duty to comply with all requirements under Part B of Title IV of the Social Security
Act (42 U.S.C. § 620 et seq.) and Part E of Title IV of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. §
670
et seq.) that are relevant to the protection and welfare of children in foster care.").
264
TerrellR., 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 646.
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265

Even though the ultimate placement
(here, placement and supervision).
social worker's discretion, a social
the
to
degree
some
to
left
be
may
decision
to certain criteria in making that
adhere
and
to
evaluate
worker is still required
266
decision.
2. A fundamentalpurpose of the child welfare statutes is to prevent child
abuse.
The Court of Appeal's conclusion that the child welfare statutes imposed
only nonobligatory duties was unprecedented. Even more controversial,
however, was the court's conclusion-made without analysis or citation to
authority 267-that the purpose of statutes governing foster care placement "is to
preserve the family relationship, not to prevent sexual abuse. ,,268 As an initial
matter, it is curious how the court was able to divine statutory purpose, without
analyzing or referring to the statute's text, its legislative history, case precedent
or any other authority. 269 But putting aside these obvious criticisms, the court's
conclusion is flawed for more fundamental reasons.
While it is true that a purpose of the child welfare statutes is "to preserve
the family relationship" when possible,27 ° the paramount concern of the foster
care system is the prevention of child abuse. 271 This conclusion logically
265A

long line of cases holds that even if a statute does not impose a mandatory duty to take

a specified action, a mandatory duty may exist to investigate or fulfill certain criteria in
making that decision. See, e.g., Brenneman v. State, 256 Cal. Rptr. 363, 366 (Ct. App. 1989)

(holding that statute did not impose mandatory duty to take action, but did impose a
mandatory duty to investigate); State v. Superior Court (Perry), 197 Cal. Rptr. 914, 922-23
(Ct. App. 1984) (explaining that real estate commissioner had a mandatory duty to
investigate complaints of wrongdoing, but that the statute did not impose mandatory duty to
take action in event of wrongdoing). See generally CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENT TORT
LIABILITY PRACTICE, supra note 150, § 9.32 (explaining that although a statutory provision
may create a mandatory duty in one area (e.g., to investigate), the statute may not create a
mandatory duty in another (e.g., to act)).
266 See, e.g., Becerra v. County of Santa Cruz, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 165, 170 (Ct. App. 1998);
Elton v. County of Orange, 84 Cal. Rptr. 27, 30-31 (Ct. App. 1970); cf Wood v. County of

San Joaquin, 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d 340, 351 (Ct. App. 2003) (relying on Elton and citing foster
care as situation in which mandatory duties exist).
267 Terrell R., 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 646-47.
268 Id. (interpreting the purpose of section 7950 of the California Family Code; sections

16000, 16002(b), and 16501.1(c) of the California Welfare and Institutions Code; and
regulations 31-420.2, 31-405.1(j), and 31-420.1 of the California Department of Social
Services's Manual of Policiesand Procedures).

Cf CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1859 (West Supp. 2004) (mandating that in construing a
statute the intention of the legislature is to be pursued). See generally William N. Eskridge,
Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretationas PracticalReasoning, 42 STAN. L. REv.
321, 322 (1990) (discussing and explaining various theories of statutory interpretation and
concluding that courts consider a "broad range of textual, historical, and evolutive evidence
when it interprets statutes").
270 Terrell R., 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 646-47.
271 See. e.g., FINAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 4 (stating the priority that "[clhildren are, first
269
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follows because the state only has the right to remove a child from a parents'
custody when compelling circumstances, such as abuse or neglect, compel that
removal.272 The state likewise may only return a child to his or her parents'
custody when it is safe to do so. 273 The majority of minors who are placed in
27 4
the foster care system are placed because of evidence of parental abuse.
Similarly, the reason behind placing a child in a relative's home,2 7 5 or keeping
siblings together, is the belief that the preservation of family ties, when safe to
do so, best protects a child's welfare. 276 Hence, contrary to the court's holding,
and foremost, protected from abuse and neglect"); David J.Herring, The Adoption and Safe
FamiliesAct-Hope and Its Subversion, 34 FAM.L.Q. 329, 329 (2000) (stating that Congress
was clear, in passing the Adoption and Safe Families Act, that the paramount goal for public
welfare systems is to secure the health and safety of children within the systems); see also
Dorothy E. Roberts, Is There Justice in Children's Rights? The Critique of FederalFamily
Preservation Policy, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 112 (1999) (stating that Congress's intent in
recent legislation was to make health and safety of children in foster care the top priority).
272See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 361(c) (permitting removal if, among other
circumstances, there is a "substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or
physical or emotional well-being of the minor" or the minor has been "sexually abused" and
"there are no reasonable means by which the minor can be protected from further sexual
abuse . . .without removing the minor from his or her parent of guardian"); Id. § 16501
(West 2001) (explaining that child welfare services include services directed toward, among
other things: (a) protection and promotion of the welfare of all children; (b) prevention or
remedying of child neglect, abuse, exploitation, or delinquency; (c) prevention of
unnecessary separation of children from families by identification of and assistance in
resolving family problems; and (d) restoration to families of children previously removed);
see also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (stating that natural parents have a
fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and management of their child, even if the
state has temporarily taken custody of that child); Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S.
18, 27 (1981) (stating that a state needs a "powerful countervailing interest" to interfere with
a273parent's right to her child's companionship).
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 361.5 (West Supp. 2004) (requiring no reunification, among
other things, when (1) the parent/guardian has caused the death of a child by abuse or
neglect; (2) the child was adjudicated a dependent as a result of severe sexual or physical
abuse, and the court factually finds that reunification would not be in the child's best
interests; (3) the child has been twice removed from the same home because of abuse or
neglect; or (4) the parents sexually molested the child).
274 Nationwide, more than fifty percent of children placed in foster care are removed from
their family homes because they suffered parental abuse. See STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON
WAYS AND MEANS, 103D CONG., 1994 GREEN BOOK: BACKGROUND MATERIAL AND DATA ON
PROGRAMS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS 651 (Comm.

Print 1994) (stating that more than 50% of children placed in substitute care were separated
from their parents specifically for protection, while an additional 20.9% were removed
because the parent was absent or unfit); see also Brendan P. Kearse, Abused Again:
Competing ConstitutionalStandards for the State's Duty to Protect Foster Children, 29
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 385, 385 (1996).

See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7950 (requiring placement "in the home of a relative, unless the
placement would not be in the best interest of the child").
276 Jim Moye, City Hall Can Be Beaten: Litigation Strategies for Child and Family
Advocates Under the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, 4 J.L. & FAM. STUDIES 303,
305-06 (2002) (noting studies where children placed in foster care fared significantly worse
than those left in the care of biological parents able to care for them).
275
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the child welfare statutes and the foster care system are designed specifically to
protect children from abuse by temporarily removing them from their abusive
homes.277
Additionally, the court's ruling is difficult, if not impossible, to square with
the statutes' plain language, which speaks directly to ensuring that the County
278
To provide
places children in safe homes and looks after their best interests.
states
Code
Institutions
and
Welfare
the
of
300.2
section
just a few examples,
and
safety
maximum
provide
"to
is
laws
that the purpose of the dependency
the
ensure
to
.
.
and
protectionfor children who are currently [being abused]
safety, protection, and physical and emotional well-being of children who are
at risk of that harm." 279 Section 16501.1 of the Welfare and Institutions Code
explains that the foster care system was "designed to provide time-limited
protective services to prevent or remedy neglect, abuse or exploitation, for the
' 28°
Numerous
purposes of preventing separation of children from their families.
281
R., the
Terrell
since
Indeed,
other provisions use similar language.
Legislature enacted section 16000.1 of the Welfare and Institution Code to
clarify that "the state has a duty to care for and protect the children that the
state places into foster care, and as a matter of public policy, the state assumes
an obligation of the highest order to ensure the safety of children in foster

277CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE

§ 300.2; see also In re Santos Y., 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 692, 727

(2001) (explaining that the three primary goals of the dependency statutes are to: (1) protect
the child; (2) preserve the family and safeguard the parents' fundamental right to raise their
child, as long as these can be accomplished with the child being safe; and (3) provide a
stable, permanent home for the child); Jordy v. County of Humboldt, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 553,
558 (Ct. App. 1992) (stating that juvenile court law was enacted to prevent specific evils of
intentional abuse and systemic neglect); Hansen v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 238 Cal. Rptr. 232,
236 (Ct. App. 1987) (explaining that child welfare services are intended to protect children
from abuse); ef Alejo v. City of Alhambra, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 768, 774 (Ct. App. 1999)
(finding that "the mandatory duty to investigate and report accounts of child abuse was
intended to 'protect children from child abuse"').
278 See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 7950 (permitting placement with
relatives only when in the
"'child's best interest" and after evaluation "as an appropriate placement resource"); CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE § 16500 (West 2001) (declaring legislative intent that under the Public
Child Welfare Service Act "all children are entitled to be safe and free from abuse and
neglect"); Id. § 16501.1 (West Supp. 2004) (explaining that placement shall be based upon
"selection of a safe setting" "best suited to meet the child's special needs and best interests").
279CAL. WELF & INST. CODE § 300.2 (emphasis added).
20
1 Id. § 16501.1(b) (emphasis added).
281 See, e.g., id. § 300.2 (stating that purpose of dependency statutes is "to provide maximum
safety and protection for children"); id. § 361.3 (stating that placement with relatives
requires evaluation of whether the relative can provide a "safe, secure, and stable
environment" for the child); id. § 16001.9 (West Supp. 2004) (stating that children in foster

care have the right to be "free from physical, sexual, emotional, or other abuse"); id. § 16500
(West 2001) (stating that "all children are entitled to be safe and free from abuse and

neglect"); id. § 16501. 1(b) (West Supp. 2004) (requiring case plans "to ensure that the child
receives protection and safe and proper care"); id. § 16501.1(c) (requiring that placement
decisions be based on a selection of a "safe setting"); id. § 16501.15 (defining "safe" under

section 16501.1 to mean that the "home or setting is free from abuse or neglect").
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282

care."
Case precedent interpreting these statutes also supports the conclusion that
one of the purposes of the child welfare statutes is to prevent abuse. 283 As one
on
court has explained, the foster care statutes impose a duty of supervision 284
social workers that "was clearly designed to protect" against child abuse.
Moreover, there is a "direct and rationally deducible connection between the
agency's negligent placement of a child in an inappropriate foster home and the
injury to the child.,

285

Legislative history also runs contrary to the court's findings. Much of
California's foster care regulations are based on federal legislation. 21 In 1980,
Congress enacted the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act, 287 which
California adopted in 1982.288 That legislation sought to deemphasize the use of
foster care and to promote other means of remedying child abuse and neglect
while preserving families. 289 It required welfare agencies to make reasonable
efforts to maintain children with their families, and if that was not possible, to
reunify children with their families as soon as it was safe to do so.290 Although
family preservation or family reunification was a key component of the 1980
legislation, child safety was still of paramount concern. 291 If, however, there
was any doubt that the overall purpose of the child welfare laws was to prevent
abuse, that doubt was erased in 1997.
282

1d. § 16000.1 (emphasis added).

283 See, e.g., Hansen v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 238 Cal. Rptr. 232, 236 (Ct. App. 1987)
(discussing section 16501 and explaining that one of its purposes is to prevent or remedy the
neglect, abuse, and exploitation of children); Smith v. Alameda County Soc. Servs. Agency,
153 Cal. Rptr. 712, 718 (Ct. App. 1979) (noting that foster care placement statutes, as
contrasted with certain adoption statutes, were "designed to protect the health and safety of
dependent children ....); cf Jordy v. County of Humboldt, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 553, 560 (Ct.
App. 1992) (finding that a "public entity has a duty to prevent physical abuse of children in
the custody of the state where it has notice of the abuse").
284 Shelton v. City of Westminster, 188 Cal. Rptr. 205, 210 (Ct. App. 1982) (emphasis
omitted).
28 5
Id.
286 FOSTER, supra note 5, at 43-47 (describing major legislative milestones affecting
California's foster care system).
287 Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat. 500 (1980) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
288 California's system was revised to conform to the federal Adoption Assistance and Child
Welfare Act in 1982. Act of Sep. 12, 1982, ch. 978, 1982 Cal. Stat. 3525; see also FOSTER,
supra note 5, at 43-47.
289 S.REP. No. 96-336, at 1 (1979).
290Alice C. Shotton, Making Reasonable Efforts in Child Abuse and Neglect Cases: Ten
Years Later, 26 CAL. W. L. REV.223, 223-25 (1990) (examining the legislative history of the
Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980); see also Martin Guggenheim, The
Foster Care Dilemma and What to Do About It: Is the Problem that Too Many Children Are
Not Being Adopted Out of Foster Care or that Too Many Children Are Entering Foster
Care?, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 141, 141-43 (1999).
291Shotton, supra note 290, at 230-33; see also CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 361.54 (West
Supp. 2004) (providing exceptions to reunification in cases of likely abuse).
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292
which
In 1997, Congress enacted the Adoption and Safe Families Act,
California implemented in 1998.293 In that Act, Congress amended the Child
Welfare Act to explicitly state that the "paramount goal for public child welfare
systems is to secure the health and safety of the children who enter" the welfare
system. 294 The Act thus "prioritize[d] child health and safety over family
preservation." 295 Indicative of Congress' move away from family reunification
were the Act's requirements that states terminate parental rights for children
who have been in foster care for fifteen of the past twenty-two months. 29 6 The
Act also significantly shortened the timeframe in which reunification could
occur,297 requiring a permanency hearing within twelve months after a child is
placed in foster care. 298 Finally, states were relieved of their efforts to reunify
the child with their family, if a court determined that a parent has: (a) murdered
one of their children; (b) committed involuntary manslaughter of one of their
children; (c) conspired to commit murder or involuntary manslaughter against
one of their children; (d) committed a felony assault resulting in serious bodily
injury to the child or the other parent; or (e) had their parental right's
involuntarily terminated for one of their other children. 299 Several
commentators even criticized Congress for overly emphasizing child health and
safety and for dictating aggressive permanency planning, rather than promoting
family reunification. 30 0 In light of this 1997 legislation, Congress and the

292 Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115

(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42

U.S.C.).

Act of Sept. 30, 1998, ch. 1056, 1998 Cal. Stat. (implementing the provisions of the
federal Adoptions and Safe Families Act in California); see also FOSTER, supra note 5, at 45293

46 (describing the California's foster care legislation history).
29442 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(A) (2000) ("[T]he child's health and safety shall be the paramount
concern."); see also FOSTER, supra note 5, at 35 ("Significant changes in federal and state
laws and policy reflect a re-emphasis of child safety over family preservation."); Herring,
supra note 271, at 330 (noting the emphasis in federal law on child safety); Roberts, supra
note 271, at 113 ("ASFA amends the 1980 Act to direct state authorities to make the health
and safety of children in foster care their top priority."); Developments in the Law-Unified
Family Courts and the Child Protection Dilemma, 116 HARV. L. REv. 2099, 2114-115
(2003) (tracing the history of the ASFA and noting that "[wihat emerged was the family
law's version of the absolute priority rule: while families' and parents' interests and rights
remained important, children's health and safety became the 'paramount concern' of the
child welfare system").
295 FOSTER, supra note 5, at 45.
29'45 C.F.R. § 1356.21(i) (2003); see CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 727.32 (West Supp.
2004); CAL. R. CT. 1496.3.
297 42 U.S.C. § 672(5).
29'42 U.S.C. § 1320a-9; CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 727.3; id. § 11404.1 (West 2001).
299Moye, supra note 276, at 306-07; see also 42 U.S.C.§
671(a)(15); cf CAL. WELF. & INST.
CODE § 361.5 (West Supp. 2004).
300Roberts, supranote 271, at 116-17. See generally Naomi R. Cahn, Children'sInterests in
a FamilialContext: Poverty, FosterCare, and Adoption, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1189 (1999). This
Article is not intended to engage in the continuing debate over child welfare philosophy and
whether state law should emphasize children's reunification with their biological parents
over adoption of these children by new families. Nor is it suggesting when a child should be
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California Legislature intended that at least one purpose-if not the primary
purpose-of the child welfare statutes was to prevent abuse. Terrell R. erred
when it broadly held otherwise.
In sum, the child welfare statutes were intended to assure the safety of
children. 30 1 When a child is physically or sexually abused, due to the
government's negligent failure to take legislatively mandated actions, a cause
of action for direct liability should lie. This is precisely the type of claim that
Government Code section 815.6 intended to allow.
3.

Discretionaryact immunity rarely applies to foster careplacement and
supervision.

Not only did the Terrell R. court incorrectly analyze whether there was
direct liability, the court also erred in its derivative liability analysis. The court
concluded that "a social worker is immune from liability for negligent
supervision of a foster child unless the social worker fails to provide specific
services mandated by statute or regulation." 30 2 Building on Becerra's faulty
analysis, the court explained that discretionary act immunity under Government
Code section 820.2 applied, because foster care supervision is "an activity
loaded with subjective determinations, and fraught with major possibilities of
an erroneous decision.' '30 3 In so ruling, the court applied the literal definition of
"discretionary" that has been repeatedly rejected by the California Supreme
Court, 30 4 confused derivative and direct liability, and ignored the rules of stare
decisis.
The court of appeal first erred in its discretionary immunity analysis when
30 5
it found that a social worker is immune for all acts not mandated by statute.
No such immunity exists. As described above, 30 6 immunity attaches only to
"basic policy decisions"-those decisions that involve planning rather than
operational or ministerial decisions. 3 07 The California Supreme Court has made

removed from the parental home, or questioning whether the law sufficiently promotes
family preservation. But there is universal agreement that children who have been severely
physically or sexually abused must be protected. The Article thus makes only the modest
point that whether the means to achieving child safety are through family preservation or
adoption from foster care, the purpose of the statutes is to protect children from harm.
301 In this respect California is not different than other states. See generally Martin, supra
note 93, at 194-95 (1991) (surveying states' child welfare statutes and noting that all the
"statutes have as their purpose the protection of abused children").
302 County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (Terrell R.), 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 637, 649 (Ct.
App. 2002), reh 'g denied, 2002 Cal. App. LEXIS 4872 (Ct. App. Oct. 18, 2002), rev,. denied,
Cal. LEXIS 8629 (Dec. 18, 2002).
2002
303 id.
34
See supra notes 148-155 and accompanying text.
305 Terrell R., 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 648-50.
306 See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
307
Bamer v. Leeds, 13 P.3d 704, 709 (Cal. 2000).
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this point repeatedly. 30 8 To determine whether a "basic policy decision" has
been made, a court must look to the underlying rationales supporting
governmental immunity (i.e. in this case, separation of powers).30 9 But the
Terrell R. court neither explained why the alleged supervision constituted a
basic policy decision, nor discussed how the rationales underlying
governmental immunity required finding that the social worker had made a
basic policy decision in neglecting to supervise the foster child. 310 Instead, the
court applied the impermissible literal or semantic definition of "discretionary"
to conclude that immunity applied to all nonmandatory obligations. 3 1 That
analysis was misguided.
This analytical error must have been caused by the court's confusion
between derivative liability and direct liability. As explained above in Part II,
only direct liability is concerned with whether a mandatory duty is imposed. 312
Derivative liability is broader, permitting a government entity to be sued for the
negligent acts of employees unless the government makes a strong showing
that a basic policy decision is involved.3 13 In Terrell R., the court never
explained how the government met this burden. Moreover, it applied the same
standard for both the derivative and direct liability issues because it held that
social workers are immune from negligent supervision claims "unless the social
3 14
worker fails to provide specific services mandated by statute or regulation.,
By doing so, the court conflated two distinct bases of liability. If the court's
analysis was correct and discretionary act immunity under section 820.2
applied to all nonmandatory acts, section 820.2 would be rendered a nullity.
There would never be an occasion to analyze whether derivative liability exists
because the direct liability analysis would be dispositive in all cases: any
nonmandatory act would entitle the employee to immunity. But sections 820.2
and 815.6 are not mere repeats of one another, and should not be read to be
redundant. 315 Basic canons of statutory construction reject such a conclusion.
308 Id.; see also

Caldwell v. Montoya, 897 P.2d 1320, 1326 (Cal. 1995); Nunn v. State, 677
P.2d 846, 849 (Cal. 1984) (en banc); Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334,
350 (Cal. 1976); Johnson v. State, 447 P.2d 352, 360 (Cal. 1968).
309 See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying
text.
310 TerrellR., 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 648-50.
"' Id. at 644-45, 649 (stating that "[t]he appropriate degree of supervision of a foster parent,
in excess of the visitation schedule mandated by statute or regulation, is a uniquely
discretionary activity" and noting that "discretionary decisions" made in connection with
placement
decisions should be outside the scope of review).
312
Seesupra Part II.C. 1-2.
313Johnson, 447 P.2d at 363 (explaining that government has a heavy burden and must
make
a "strong showing" to overcome the presumption against immunity); see also supra Part
II.C.2 and note 171.
314
TerrellR., 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 649.
315 Cal. Pac. Collections, Inc. v. Powers, 449 P.2d 225, 227 (Cal. 1969) (en banc) (reasoning
that a court may not construe a statute to render language "'redundant and a nullity, thereby
violating one of the most elementary principles of statutory construction"); Napa Valley
Wine Train, Inc. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 787 P.2d 976, 979 n.1 I (Cal. 1990) ("[W]e are not
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The Terrell R. court not only applied an improper standard to
discretionary-act immunity, but also departed from prior precedent that was
directly on point. The Elton decision was on all fours. Elton, just like Terrell
R., involved the failure to place a child in a properly certified home and to
properly supervise. 316 But the Terrell R. court summarily rejected the Elton
holding. Rather than discuss Elton in detail, in a footnote the court dismissed
Elton as "not controlling" because: (1) "the appeal in Elton followed a
demurrer, not a summary judgment;" (2) "Elton was decided prior to the
adoption of statutes mandating the exercise of discretion by social workers";
and (3) the appellate "court [that decided Elton] . . . later severely limited the
holding of Elton and described the decision as 'difficult. '' 317 But each reason
given for ignoring Elton was specious.
First, no distinction should be made between the demurrer and the
summary judgment, because the court's determination of whether
governmental immunity applies involves threshold questions of law. 318 The
Terrell R. court recognized this itself.319 More specifically, the court did not
limit itself to finding that the social worker had fulfilled the mandatory duties
prescribed by the statutes and regulations. 320 Rather, the court ruled, as a matter
321
of law, that the statutes and regulations set forth no mandatory duties.
Second, that certain statutes (notably unidentified by the Terrell R. court) may
allow social workers to exercise discretion, as explained above, is not relevant
in determining whether discretionary act immunity applies, because it does not
322
explain whether a basic policy decision has been made in a particular case.
That distinction is therefore no distinction at all. The factual basis for this

willing to assume that the Legislature has enacted a nullity[.]"); see also Bailey v. United
States, 516 U.S. 137, 146 (1995) ("We assume that Congress used two terms because it
intended each term to have a particular, nonsuperfluous meaning."); Reiter v. Sonotone
Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979) ("In construing a statute we are obliged to give effect, if
possible, to every word Congress used."); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 392 (1979)
(explaining that an "elementary canon of construction [is] that a statute should be interpreted
so as not to render one part inoperative").

316 Elton v. County of Orange, 84 Cal. Rptr. 27 (Ct. App. 1970).
311 Terrell R., 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 649 n.5.
318 See, e.g., Bamer v. Leeds, 13 P.3d 704, 709 (Cal. 2000) (determining discretionary act
immunity as a question of law after the trial court granted summary judgment); Haggis v.
City of Los Angeles, 993 P.2d 983, 987 (Cal. 2000) ("Whether an enactment creates a
mandatory duty is a question of law . "); Nunn v. State, 677 P.2d 846, 851 (Cal. 1984)
(explaining that whether an enactment is intended to impose a mandatory duty is a question
of law); see also Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Superior Court, 976 P.2d 808, 821 (Cal.
1999) (holding that a court must conduct de novo review of a trial court's resolution of
underlying statutory construction issues).
319 Terrell R., 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 643 (explaining that whether a mandatory duty exists and
whether
a government is immune from suit raise questions of law).
320
Id. at 648-50.
3211d. at 645-48.
322 See supra Part II.C.2; see also supra note 161 (discussing cases finding derivative
liability where a government employee was negligent after making basic policy decision).
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assertion is also suspect. If anything, recent federal legislation adopted by
California provides greater, not less, guidance as to what social workers can or
can not do. 12 Third, the TerrellR. court is simply wrong when it suggested that
the court of appeal later "severely limited the holding of Elton" in foster care
abuse cases. On the contrary, the Elton court, in Ronald S. v. County of San
Diego, was explicit that it was not attempting to "disapprov[e] or retreat from"
Elton.324 Instead, the Ronald S. court recognized that immunity would not
the foster care context. 325 Terrell R. thus provided no reason why it
attach in
should depart from established law.

V. A RETURN TO WHAT THE LEGISLATURE INTENDED

As shown above, the Terrell R. court erred. That it did so, however, begs a
question: how should a court methodically analyze a negligent placement or
supervision claim in the future? Synthesizing Parts II and III above, what
follows is a framework for how judges should correctly analyze foster care
abuse cases, followed by a short explanation for why holding governments
liable for negligent foster care placement and supervision is a sound result.
A. The Resolution ofNegligent Placementand Negligent Supervision Claims
The resolution of negligent placement and supervision claims mirror one
another. For both types of claims, as discussed above, a court must address
whether the government may be held directly or derivatively liable: two
separate and distinct analyses. 326 In deciding whether either liability prong is
satisfied, a court must keep in mind that the Legislature intended liability to be
the rule, not the exception. 327

1. Directgovernmental liability.
As explained, a government is directly liable if a social worker fails to
consider and assess the mandatory criteria set forth in the placement and
supervision statutes, and those failings result in the child's injuries. 328 In a
323 See supra notes 292-301 and accompanying text (discussing 1997 federal legislation

adopted in California in 1998); see also supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text
(discussing California's failure to meet federal and state mandatory foster care
requirements).
324

Ronald S. v. County of San Diego, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 418, 425 (Ct. App. 1993); see also

supra notes 198-200 and accompanying text.
325 See Ronald S., 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 425 (explaining that when a child is in the custody of
the county, the county's administration and surveillance of that child is properly
characterized
as ministerial).
326
See supra Parts II.C & III.A.
327
See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
328 By way of example only, these mandatory duties during placement would include, but are
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negligent placement claim, a government avoids liability if evidence exists that
the social worker evaluated and assessed all the statutorily required criteria, and
that a rationale existed for choosing a placement based on the criteria
considered. 329 This is because under the direct liability standard, a government
is not liable merely because the court disagrees with the selection ultimately
made, so long as the criteria and priorities of the statutes and regulations are
adhered to. 330 If, however, any of the required criteria were not considered or
331
the required duties were not met, the government is per se negligent.
Evidence that a social worker placed a child in a particular foster care home
because of convenience, or cost, or for expediency-reasons not set forth in the
statutes as being permissible placement criteria should expose the
government to liability. This is because the specific placement criteria which a
332
social worker must consider before placing any foster child are mandatory,
and requirements such as considering whether the foster placement is a safe
333
setting are specifically intended to protect the foster child from abuse.
The same principles apply to a negligent supervision claim. Under a
negligent supervision theory, a government would be liable if, among other
things, a social worker failed to take reasonable efforts to monthly visit the
children to which they are assigned, 334 maintain and regularly update a case
not limited to: (1) taking reasonable efforts to prevent out-of-home placements,

CAL. WELF.

& INST. CODE § 16501.1(b)(1) (West Supp. 2004); (2) basing the choice of an out-of-home
placement on the selection of a "safe setting that is the least restrictive or most family-like,"
id. § 16501.1(c); (3) considering, in the order prioritized by the statute, where to place the
child (such as with relatives), id.; (4) taking diligent efforts to place siblings together in the
same home, or to explain why the siblings were not placed together, id. § 16002(b); (5)
explicitly setting forth in the case plan why the placement is in the best interests of the child,
if the child is placed a "substantial distance from the home of the child's parent," id. §
16501.1 (f)(7); and (6) considering the other placement criteria and priorities set forth by the
statutes
and regulations, id. § 361.3; DSS MANUAL, supra note 244, regs. 31-420.1, 31-420.2.
329
Becerra v. County of Santa Cruz, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 165, 170 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (holding
that "the mandatory duty imposed by [Welfare and Institutions Code] section 16501.1 was
the County's assessment of statutory factors as part of its placement decision" and finding no
direct liability when "social workers made a placement assessment consistent with their
statutory mandate, evaluating the required criteria ....
");cf Haggis v. City of Los Angeles,
993 P.2d 983, 989-90 (Cal. 2000) (explaining in a real property development case that under
municipal codes, the city has a mandatory duty to make certain inspections and
determinations about the condition of the property and, if the condition is determined to be
unstable, to record a certificate of substandard condition); Braman v. State of California, 33
Cal. Rptr. 2d 608, 612-13 (Ct. App. 1994) (finding that statute imposed a mandatory duty to
consider
and investigate prior to selling firearm to prospective firearm purchaser).
330
See supra Part I.C.
331See supra notes 124-132 and accompanying text; see also Becerra, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
170.
332
See supra note 328.
313
See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 16501.15 (defining a "safe" home as one free from
abuse
or neglect).
334
Id. § 16516.5(a) (requiring that foster children placed in group homes "shall be visited at
least monthly by a county social worker or probation officer" and that "[e]ach visit shall
include a private discussion between the foster child and the county social worker"); DSS
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plan for the foster child,335 hold a timely permanency hearing, 336 or provide
family reunification services.337 Direct liability exists in such circumstances, so
long as causal injury can be shown, because: (1) the foster care statutes and

regulations use obligatory language, 338 and (2) the purpose of requiring visits,
case plans, permanency hearings, and family reunification is to protect foster
339
children from harm.
2. Derivative governmentalliability.

Once a court has resolved the direct liability issue, a court must also
address the derivative liability question. A government can be held derivatively
liable, if a social worker negligently places or supervises a child in a foster care
home, regardless of whether the mandatory duties are complied with.340
Although the decision to place a child in foster care is a basic policy decision to
which prosecutorial immunity attaches, 341 the exercise of that discretion and the
placement and supervision of a child in a particular foster home must be done
with due care. 342 A government is not immune simply because a social worker
has discretion to make choices. 343 Immunity attaches only if the social worker
344
makes a basic policy decision.
supra note 244, regs. 31-320.2, 31-320.41 ("[T]he social worker shall visit the
child at least three times in the first thirty calendar days, including the initial in-person
response."); see also Scott v. County of Los Angeles, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 643, 652-53 (Ct. App.
1994) (indicating that a mandatory duty exists to regularly visit).
335
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 16501.1 (d)-(f) (setting forth case plan
requirements).
336
,d. § 361.5; CAL. R. CT. 1461(a).
337
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 16000 (requiring that "[flamily reunification services shall
be
provided for expeditious reunification of the child with his or her family, as required by
law").
338
See supranotes 140-142 and accompanying text.
339
See supra Part III.C.2; see generally CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 16000.1 (noting that
the
state has a duty to "care for and protect the children that the state places into foster care").
340 See supra notes 120-123 and accompanying text; see also Part II.C.2.
341Alicia T. v. County of Los Angeles, 271 Cal. Rptr. 513, 519-20 (Ct. App. 1990); Jenkins
v. County of Orange, 260 Cal. Rptr. 645, 647-48 (Ct. App. 1989).
342See Elton v. County of Orange, 84 Cal. Rptr. 27, 29-32 (Ct. App. 1970); supra Part 1ILA;
see also supra note 195 (listing cases throughout country that hold that states are answerable
for injuries suffered by foster children as a result of negligence in foster care placement or
supervision).
343
See supra text accompanying notes 148-170 (explaining how
the California Legislature
and the California Supreme Court have consistently rejected granting governmental
employees immunity simply because they exercise discretion or make choices). See
MANUAL,

generally CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENT TORT LIABILITY PRACTICE, supra note 150, § 10.16

(explaining how the California Supreme Court has rejected a semantic approach to discretion
because "taken literally, the term 'discretionary' lends itself to such a wide range of
applications that it could conceivably nullify almost all vicarious liability of public entities
under the Tort Claims Act for employee torts-a result clearly inconsistent with legislative
intent").
344See supra Parts II.C.2. See generally CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENT TORT LIABILITY
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To some extent, whether immunity applies will depend on the nature of
plaintiff's claim. A county is entitled to immunity, for example, if the plaintiff
argues that the child should never have been placed in foster care, or that the
social worker should have considered other criteria not set forth by the statutes.
That abused children should be placed in foster care rather than kept with their
families, or that certain criteria instead of others should be considered, are highlevel decisions made by the legislature. If, however, a social worker ignored
warning signs that should have placed a reasonable social worker on notice that
the foster parents posed a danger to the child, then immunity can not be
conferred.34 5 A social worker has no discretion, either in placement or
supervision, to ignore warning signs that a child is in danger. Stated differently,
the child welfare statutes impose a general duty for social workers to protect
346
foster children in their control against intentional foster parent abuse.
In short, the decision to place a child with, or supervise a child in, a
PRACTICE, supra note 150, § 10.10-12 (describing long line of California Supreme Court
authority finding that immunity only attaches to "basic policy" decisions).
345 Jordy v. County of Humboldt, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 553, 559-60 (Ct. App. 1992) (agreeing
with other cases holding that a "public entity has a duty to prevent physical abuse of children
in the custody of the state where it has notice of the abuse").
346 See, e.g., id. at 559-60 (discussing general duty to protect children from intentional
physical abuse); see also Vonner v. State Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 273 So. 2d 252, 253 (La.
1973) (holding that the state has a duty to protect against intentional physical abuse causing
serious injury); Braam ex rel. Braam v. State, 81 P.3d 851, 856 (Wash. 2003) (finding that a
foster child has a substantive due process right to be free from abuse). This general duty on
behalf of the state to protect foster children within the state's custody from intentional abuse
is recognized throughout the country, often as a constitutional right. See, e.g., Norfleet v.
Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 989 F.2d 289, 293 (8th Cir. 1993) (recognizing a clearly
established constitutional right to reasonably safe foster care in light of other circuit court
precedents); Yvonne L. v. N.M. Dep't of Human Servs., 959 F.2d 883, 893 (10th Cir. 1992)
(explaining that "children in the custody of a state had a constitutional right to be reasonably
safe from harm"); K.H. ex rel. Murphy v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846, 851-53 (7th Cir. 1990)
(finding a constitutional right not to be placed with a foster parent who caseworkers know or
suspect is likely to abuse or neglect a foster child); Meador v. Cabinet for Human Res., 902
F.2d 474, 476 (6th Cir. 1990) ("[D]ue process extends the right to be free from the infliction
of unnecessary harm to children in state-regulated foster homes."); Griffith v. Johnston, 899
F.2d 1427, 1439 (5th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (finding a duty to provide adequate care when the
state creates a special relationship with children by removing them from their natural home
and placing them under state supervision); Taylor ex rel. Walker v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791,
797 (11th Cir. 1987) (en banc) ("[A] child involuntarily placed in a foster home is in a
situation so analogous to a prisoner in a penal institution and a child confined in a mental
health facility that the foster child may bring a section 1983 action for violation of fourteenth
amendment rights."); Doe v. New York City Dep't of Soc. Servs., 649 F.2d 134, 141 (2d Cir.
1981) (holding that a child in state custody has a constitutional right not to be placed in a
foster care setting known to be unsafe); LaShawn A. v. Dixon, 762 F. Supp. 959, 992-93
(D.D.C. 1991) (finding a constitutional liberty interest, to the extent that services are
essential, to prevent harm to children in the district's custody), aff'd and remanded on other
grounds sub nom. LaShawn A. v. Kelly, 990 F.2d 1319 (D.C. Cir. 1993); see also Charlie H.
v. Whitman, 83 F. Supp. 2d 476, 507 (D.N.J. 2000) (recognizing substantive due process
rights); Jordan v. City of Philadelphia, 66 F. Supp. 2d 638, 646 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (collecting
cases recognizing substantive due process rights of foster children).
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particular foster parent home-although involving discretionary choices-is
not a basic policy decision entitled to immunity. This is because social workers
may not make policy decisions to place children in danger, to not supervise, or
to ignore signs that the foster parents are abusive. A social worker when
deciding a particular placement (within the confines of the statutory criteria), or
when supervising that placement (again within the confines of the statutory
requirements) is not rendering a high-level decision, formulated after debate
and input from different levels of county government, with concern over the
future ramifications of that policy. Rather, a social worker is merely exercising
his or her own judgment: what the California Supreme Court has rightly
347
described as "a classic case for the imposition of tort liability."
B. A Few Final Observations

This article has attempted to demonstrate why the recent trend to ostensibly
grant the government absolute immunity in foster care abuse cases is
unprincipled and inconsistent with the Legislature's intent. 348 Before the Article
concludes, however, some brief observations as to why limited immunity is the
correct result seems appropriate.
First and most importantly, rarely granting governmental immunity in
foster care abuse cases is the right result because that is what the law requires.
The California Legislature decided long ago to abolish absolute governmental
immunity. 349 A court of appeal is simply not an appropriate forum to rethink
what the legislature has done. If the Legislature wishes to limit government
claims in foster care abuse cases, then it must say so explicitly. Of course, the
Legislature has never done so and, on the contrary, has sought to protect
350
children more not less.

Second, although always an important consideration for deciding when
liability should attach,
deterrence takes on singular importance in cases
involving the protection of children. In the foster care context, the government
is asserting itself to become the custodian of a child.352 If a government is
going to interfere with families, and parents' rights to raise their own children
as they see fit,3 53 the government better have a good reason to do so and better
141 Johnson

v. State, 447 P.2d 352, 363 (Cal. 1968).
That the California Legislature enacted legislation specifically to address
Terrell R.-a
remarkable and unusual response to a court of appeal decision-is itself strong evidence that
the courts have gone astray in resolving foster care abuse cases. See CAL. WELF. & INST.
CODE
§ 16000.1 (West Supp. 2004).
349
348

See supraPart II.A.

350 See supra notes 66-71, 286-300 and accompanying text.
351See supra notes 108-110 and accompanying text.
352 See supra Part I.A.

353 See supra note 25 and accompanying text; see also Prince v. Massachusetts,
321 U.S.
158, 166 (1944) (explaining that "the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the
parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state
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do a good job to protect those children. 354 Indeed, the entire purpose of the
foster care system is undermined if children are removed from their homes to
protect them, but then are negligently exposed to even more dangerous
conditions. 355 The strongest incentives - including the risk of civil liability are therefore needed to ensure that children are protected and that government
workers use extraordinary care to fulfill that goal. This is particularly true given
the recent revelations about California's foster care system and the apparent
perverse financial incentives that may exist for the state to improperly remove
356
children from their families.
Third, granting governments immunity when children are abused because
of a social worker's negligence, leads to a strange result. Foster children who
are injured because of their foster parents' negligent acts are entitled to recover
from the government. 3 57 They can do so through the foster care fund. 31' That
fund, however, disallows any recovery when a child is injured because of a
foster parent's intentional torts. 359 A bizarre system, not intended by the
Legislature, is thus created if children negligently injured are permitted to
recover from the government, but children who are intentionally abused may
not. In fact, in negligence cases, as compared to foster parent intentional abuse
cases, the need to recover from the government is less acute because the foster
child has other ways of seeking recovery: such as from the foster parent's

can neither supply nor hinder").
354 See generally Kindred, supra note 40, at 455-56 (discussing the competing interests of
protecting children and respecting family integrity, and arguing that because of the potential
"harm posed to children by family intervention," the "state should not intervene without
good reason"). For a discussion of how poverty has been mistaken for child neglect, and the
disparate impact that child protection services have on racial or ethnic minorities, see Candra
Bullock, Comment, Low-Income Parents Victimized by ChildProtective Services, 11 AM. U.
J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 1023 (2003).
355 See supra Part L.A (explaining that temporary child protection is the primary purpose of
foster care); see also Kindred, supra note 40, at 459 (noting that "[t]here is substantial
support for the proposition that, except in cases involving seriously harmed or abandoned
children, a child's situation is not improved through removal" and that "removal frequently
results
in placing a child in a more detrimental situation, thus compounding the harm").
356
See Troy Anderson, Foster Cash Lure May Fade, L.A. DAILY NEWS, Feb. 17, 2004, at N3
(describing financial incentives to place children in foster care); Troy Anderson, Foster
System Probe Sought by Legislators, L.A. DAILY NEWS, March 6, 2004, at N4 (noting Daily
News investigation which "uncovered estimates that as many as half of the 75,000 children
in [Los Angeles] county foster care and adoptive homes were needlessly placed in a system
often more dangerous than the homes from which they were removed," and explaining that
"[flor each child placed in the system, counties receive $30,000 to $150,000 a year"); Troy
Anderson, Supervisors Tackle Foster Care, L.A. DAILY NEWS, Feb. 18, 2004, at N3 (noting
Los Angeles County supervisors's decision to negotiate with the state and federal
governments to eliminate financial incentives for putting children in foster care).
357 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1527.1 (West 2000) (establishing Foster Family Home
and Small Family Home Insurance Fund).
358 See id.; see also Hill v. Newkirk, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 859, 864-65 (Ct. App. 1994)
(discussing claims for which the fund is liable).
"9 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1527.3(a) (excluding intentional acts from coverage).
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insurance carrier.
CONCLUSION

The California Tort Claims Acts has, until recently, long served as an
important means by which foster children may obtain recourse from the
government for injuries suffered as a result of a social worker's negligence. In
the 1990s, the California courts of appeal retreated-without justificationfrom the dictates of the Tort Claims Act and the uniform decisions of the
California Supreme Court. A low point was reached in late 2002 when, in Los
Angeles County v. Superior Court (Terrell R.), the court of appeal confused the

issues of direct and derivative liability to effectively grant social workers
absolute immunity. That case ignored over three decades of law, the purposes
behind the Tort Claims Act, and basic canons of statutory construction to reach
a result that contradicts the California Legislature's unambiguous intent.
The Legislature was wise to limit the impact of Terrell R. Contrary to
that case's holding, the child welfare statutes that use obligatory language
impose mandatory duties on social workers. Moreover, the government is not
immune when a social worker negligently supervises or places a foster child
merely because the social worker exercises "discretion." Decisions made with
respect to the maintenance, care, or supervision of a foster child are not basic
policy decisions entitled to immunity. As the California Supreme Court has
held repeatedly, governmental liability is the rule, not the exception. That
governments should be exposed to liability when social workers negligently
place or supervise foster care children is not only the law, but also supported by
strong public policy. Accordingly, in the future, the courts must be careful to
avoid the mistakes of Terrell R.

